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Under the Department of Defense's (DoD) modified capitation resource
allocation system, there are incentives to shift costs to other components of the
Military Health Services System (MHSS). In the transition to capitation budgeting,
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD/HA)
published the Transfer Payment policy in 1995 to ensure the equitable transfer of
funds between the Services and Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). This thesis
begins by providing background on the MHSS direct care system, TRICARE
Program, and DoD's modified capitation resource allocation methodology. Since
the methodology of transfer payments is based on data from currently utilized
information systems, this thesis contains a discussion of those systems as well as
those planned for deployment. The relevant prospective payment system (PPS)
costing factors used in determining a transfer price are also examined. Case
studies are used to illustrate when a transfer payment would occur and what
computations are employed in determining the amount of funds to transfer.
Although the policy was designed to provide for an equitable transfer of funds, it
has been the subject of much debate. Consequently, this thesis examines the
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This thesis will evaluate the Transfer Payment policy developed by the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD/HA) and Military
Medical Departments. Understanding the transfer payment process requires an
examination of the TRICARE program structure; the modified capitation-based
resource allocation methodology employed by Health Affairs; and the information
systems, data and specific calculations used in the determination of transfer
payment prices. Discussions will also include the incentives created by the transfer
payment policy.
B. BACKGROUND
The Military Health Services System (MHSS) is one of the nation's largest
health care systems, offering health care benefits to about 8.3 million people and
costing over $15 billion annually. The primary mission of the MHSS is to maintain
readiness by providing for the health care of approximately 1.7 million active-duty
service personnel and by being prepared to deliver health care during times of war.
However, of the 8.3 million people that receive health care through the MHSS, 29
percent is comprised of active duty family members and 50 percent represents
military retirees and their families. The number of eligible beneficiaries is expected
to decline only slightly through the year 2000, even though the active-duty forces
are being reduced because the number of retiree families will increase. [Ref. 1]
The MHSS provides health care services through an extensive worldwide
system of military medical facilities consisting of 127 military hospitals and medical
centers and 504 clinics. [Ref. 1] Inpatient referrals throughout the MHSS represent
approximately $450 million of the Defense Health Program (DHP) [Ref. 2].
The goal of the Military Health Services System is to deliver value by giving
active duty members, retirees and their families access to high quality, efficient
health care. As the nation's largest employer, the military is facing unprecedented
challenges in managing reduced resources to pay for steadily rising health care
costs similar to those confronting the civilian health care community.
Some of the reasons for increasing health care costs include: high-priced
medical technology; proliferation in facilities and services; increased labor costs;
changes in medical practice and standards; and increased utilization and normal
inflation. An important part of the solution to these problems is through a revamped
health care system where the incentives motivate everyone to pursue or provide
cost-effective health care. [Ref. 3]
With the impetus for national health care reform in 1993, the Department of
Defense (DoD) began aggressively implementing its health care reform program,
known as TRICARE, with scheduled nation-wide implementation by mid-1997. In
concert with the implementation of the TRICARE program, a capitation-based
methodology was used in Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 to resource the Military
Departments and ultimately, the individual MTFs.
Historically, under a workload-based financing scenario, MTFs were
retrospectively reimbursed for services provided to patients. In other words,
hospitals were rewarded for the amount of workload produced, not on how
efficiently that workload was processed. This method of reimbursement is known
as "fee-for-service". As the quantity of care delivered and level of resources used
continued to climb, so did the medical facility's budget. This methodology of
financing created a great disincentive for the efficient use of resources.
Recently, defense cutbacks and downsizing have reduced funding for health
care as well as other activities. To instill economic behavior in the use of
increasingly limited resources, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs (OASD/HA), hereafter referred to as Health Affairs, looked to a
population-based financial resource allocation methodology, or capitation
budgeting. As demonstrated by the popularity and success of private-sector
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), capitation provides economic
incentives to cost-effective and efficient managed care because it discourages
inappropriate hospital admissions, excessive lengths of stay and unnecessary
services. Under capitation, the military MTF commander assumes responsibility for
providing all health services to a defined population in return for an annual fixed
amount per beneficiary regardless of the type and quantity of services used. Thus,
the financial incentive has shifted from the emphasis on workload to the efficient
delivery of necessary health care to the beneficiary population. [Ref 2]
Unlike HMOs, who base their capitated rate on an enrolled, and thus well-
defined, population of beneficiaries, the Military Health Services System is tasked
with providing care to a population which is not enrolled in their health care system
and is inherently mobile. Thus, to assist military MTFs in defining their serviceable
population, "catchment areas" were assigned. The catchment area for an individual
MTF is defined as a 40 mile radius around the facility. However, as previously
alluded to, the user population of a specific military medical facility does not
necessarily come from its designated catchment area. Military beneficiaries are not
enrolled as in a civilian managed care plan and are able to go to any military
medical facility for treatment. In turn, these facilities can refer patients to other
military hospitals for care. [Ref. 2]
MTF funding and workload historically included patients from non-catchment
areas and other MTF catchment areas (referrals). Consequently, the Military
Departments were given resources in their capitated allocation for that workload.
Because the cost of care for these beneficiaries is included in the medical capitated
allocation, hospital commanders continue to receive funds to care for these
beneficiaries and continue to provide them appropriate care.
However, the problem stems from the new capitated financing system in that
the resulting capitated rate for individual medical facilities was calculated on
historical workload. MTFs are indeed funded for some historical level of referrals,
but with the new financial incentives that accompany a capitation-based resource
allocation system, subsequent shifts in workload between facilities may occur.
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Workload in some MTFs may increase, while workload in other MTFs may
decrease. Workload shifts, whether the result of clinical referral patterns, Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) driven population changes, or managed care
decisions may adversely affect the operating budgets of referral centers and result
in "windfall profits" to referring facilities. [Ref. 2]
An effective method to provide for a transfer of funds between military MTFs
is an integral part of building a competitive health services system using a business
case approach. On May 22, 1995, Health Affairs issued a transfer payment policy
to prevent possible adverse effects on the operating budgets of referring and
referral activities once capitated budgeting was fully implemented. In its policy
paper, Health Affairs has termed transfer payments a major component of the
MHSS capitation-based resource allocation. Presently, the transfer payment policy
issued by Health Affairs applies only to inpatient referrals due to the lack of
required outpatient data and inadequate information systems. Still, inpatient
referrals throughout the MHSS represent approximately $450 million of the Defense
Health Program (DHP). The transfer payment policy, in essence, was designed as
a mechanism to allow for an equitable movement (i.e., transfer) of funds from an
MTF to other MTFs where the care was actually provided. [Ref. 2]
The lack of adequate and timely information on health care has, over the
years, impeded several DoD initiatives to provide health care more cost effectively.
Inadequate information systems continue to hamper the effectiveness of MTF
commanders and their ability in implementing change. These concerns about DoD
health care management information systems become even more critical with the
implementation of TRICARE and a capitation-based resource allocation system.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question that this thesis endeavors to answer is: What is the
transfer payment policy and what will be the effect upon MTF referral policy and
resources? In addition to answering the primary question, four subsidiary research
questions will be addressed:
• What concerns necessitated the need for a transfer payment policy?
• What information systems and data were utilized in determining
the transfer payment price?
• How and when is the transfer payment price determined?
• What are the primary implementation issues of the individual
Services, Lead Agents, and MTFs?
D. SCOPE
This thesis will consist of an examination of the transfer payment policy as
currently employed by Health Affairs and the Military Departments to include:
relevant historical and background information; the information systems, data and
specific calculations used in determination of transfer payment prices; the impact
on Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) decisions as they relate to referral policy
and resources; individual Service and Lead Agent perspectives; and alternative
approaches.
E. LIMITATIONS
Because of the recent introduction of this concept, this thesis is limited to
current experiences. Due to time constraints, this thesis will terminate data
collection on 1 June 1996.
F. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Publications, instructions, and working papers from DoD, Health Affairs, and
various Military Medical Departments were reviewed for areas relating to transfer
payments, capitation based resourcing and the TRICARE program. This provided
background data on practices and policies.
Key personnel from Health Affairs and the individual Services were
interviewed to gain additional insight and perspectives into the current transfer
payment policy.
G. DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS
Definitions of certain terms presented in the thesis are given as they arise.
A list of abbreviations and acronyms is presented after the Table of Contents.
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Following the introduction chapter, which provided a general introduction to
the concept and current policy on transfer payments, this thesis is organized into
five chapters.
Chapter II will provide an overview of the MHSS direct care system, the
TRICARE program, the DoD modified capitation-based resource allocation system,
and the information systems utilized and under development in support of DoD
capitation. More specifically, this chapter will also discuss the decision making
process and organizational structure of the MHSS direct care system and TRICARE
program.
Chapter III provides an overview of those transfer payment factors used in
computing the actual transfer payment. Specifically, this chapter will provide a
discussion on diagnosis related groups (DRGs), length of stay (LOS), relative
weighted products (RWPs), case-mix index (CMI), and adjusted standardized
amounts (ASAs).
Chapter IV will examine through case studies when a transfer payment is
required and how the transfer payment is calculated. The transfer payment
formulas will be presented with accompanying explanations and examples.
Chapter V will present the transfer payment policy implementation issues that
currently concern the Services and lead agents. This chapter is not meant to
provide a critical review of the policy, but rather consolidates those issues that may
impact upon the successful implementation of the transfer payment policy. Various
examples will be provided as needed.
Chapter VI will conclude this thesis with a summary, conclusions and
recommendations, and directions for future research.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM (MHSS)
As noted in Chapter I, the MHSS offers health care benefits to about 8.3
million people and costing over $15 billion annually. In 1995, the medical budget
represented about 6 percent of the total defense budget. The primary mission of
the MHSS is to maintain readiness by providing for the health care of approximately
1.7 million active-duty service personnel and to be prepared to deliver health care
during times of war. The MHSS also provides services to some 6.6 million
nonactive-duty beneficiaries. Health care services are delivered through an
extensive system of military treatment facilities (MTFs) located throughout the
world and through an insurance-like program called the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). [Ref 1]
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) is responsible for
planning, policy development, and oversight of the MHSS. These responsibilities
include developing guidance on DoD health plans and programs; ensuring that
medical programs and systems meet operational readiness requirements;
establishing requirements and standards for DoD medical and acquisition
programs; programming and budgeting MHSS resources and funds, except for
personnel and construction funds; and administering CHAMPUS.
Each Service, in turn, has its own medical department (The Navy's Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED); the U.S. Army Medical Command
(USAMEDCOM); and the U.S. Air Force Medical Department) each headed by it's
own surgeon general. Each of the Services' medical departments prepares a
medical program budget for Health Affairs, develops Service-specific programs, and
operates the Services' MTFs. Each Service also recruits and funds its own medical
personnel to administer the medical programs and provide health care services.
Funding for the MHSS is provided through a single defense medical
appropriations account, the Defense Health Program (DHP) Appropriation. The
DHP provides the necessary resources for the delivery of medical and dental
services to the active forces and other eligible beneficiaries. It provides funds for
operation and maintenance, procurement, research and development, medical
command headquarters, specialized services for the training of medical personnel,
occupational and industrial health care, and CHAMPUS. The DHP also provides
funding for the acquisition of expensive capital equipment in support of military
MTFs, training, facilities, and programs, but does not include funds for military
construction (funded through a separate account) and active and reserve medical
personnel. Active duty medical pay is included in the DHP Program Objective
Memorandum (POM), but is transferred to the Military Departments for budget
execution. [Ref. 4]
Health Affairs directs the distribution of funds to the Services, which then
allocate the funds to their MTFs and other activities. Figure 1 depicts the flow of
funds from the DHP to Health Affairs, the Services' Medical Departments, and
ultimately to the individual MTFs and other medical activities.
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Figure 1. Depicts flow of funds from DHP
1. The Direct Care System
Active duty personnel and other eligible beneficiaries receive their health
care services directly through an extensive system of DoD operated hospitals and
clinics, staffed by civilian and military medical personnel. This delivery system has
become known as the direct care system. Three-fourths of all heath care services
are provided through the direct care system while one-fourth is provided through
CHAMPUS. Active-duty personnel and their family members make up about one-
half of the eligible beneficiary population. The other half consists of retirees, their
family members, and survivors.
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The combined MTF capabilities of all three Services include over 600 MTFs
and is composed of 127 military hospitals and 504 clinics. The MTFs employ about
48,000 civilians, as well as 135,000 active duty military, and about 91,000
personnel in the Selected Reserves and National Guard are assigned to medical
missions.
There are three categories of MTFs: (1) Medical Centers, which are large
tertiary care facilities, ranging in size from about 200 to 1 ,000 beds, offering both
inpatient and outpatient care; (2) Community hospitals, typically with fewer than 200
beds, also offer inpatient and outpatient care but usually handle less complex cases
than the medical centers; (3) Clinics, which are generally small facilities offering a
limited range of primary care services and usually only on an outpatient basis
(although some can do so in emergencies). Cases requiring more extensive
treatment are referred to other military or civilian facilities. [Ref. 5]
Although fewer in number, the medical centers provide a larger portion of
direct care. In 1992, about 57 percent of the inpatient workload and about one-third
of the outpatient workload in the direct care system were handled in medical
centers. Community hospitals handled about 43 percent of the direct care inpatient
workload and about 60 percent of the outpatient workload. The remaining
outpatient care was delivered in clinics. In FY94, MTFs admitted 704,232 patients,
delivered 67,223 babies and had 46,189,193 outpatient visits. [Ref. 1]
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2. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS)
Since 1956, DoD has been authorized to treat nonactive-duty people within
the MHSS. Legislative actions in 1956 and 1966 1 gave family members of active-
duty personnel, retirees and their family members, and survivors access to care in
MTFs on a space available basis. When health care services are not available in
MTFs to nonactive-duty beneficiaries, these beneficiaries can receive health care
from the private-sector through CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS is a program of medical
benefits provided by the U.S. Government under public law. Active duty members
are not eligible, but receive health care services through the direct care system.
Under CHAMPUS, DoD pays a portion of the cost of care. CHAMPUS is
automatically available to the families of active-duty personnel, retirees and their
family members, and survivors under the age of 65. At age 65, beneficiaries are
no longer eligible for CHAMPUS because they become eligible for Medicare.
However, Medicare eligible beneficiaries may still receive care through the direct
care system on a space-available basis.
CHAMPUS is comparable to private-sector indemnity (fee-for-service) health
benefit plans, requiring beneficiaries to pay for care up to an annual deductible
amount, and then pay a portion of the remaining costs; however beneficiaries are
not required to pay premiums for CHAMPUS. The amount of the deductible and
copayment varies by type and source of health care and by different beneficiary
dependents' Medical Care Act (P.L. 84-569), in 1956, and the Military Medical
Benefits Amendments of 1966 (PL. 89-614)
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groups, ranging from $50 to $300 for the deductible and 20 to 25 percent for
copayments. CHAMPUS eligibility, benefits and cost sharing are defined in
Chapter 55 of Title 10, United States Code.
To help ensure fuller utilization of the direct care system, CHAMPUS will not
pay for private-sector inpatient hospital care and some high cost outpatient care
provided to beneficiaries living within a 40-mile radius of an MTF unless those
beneficiaries receive prior approval from the facility. This approval is called a
"nonavailability statement" and it tells the beneficiary that the MTF could not
provide the necessary treatment within the required time frame or did not have the
capability to provide the needed health care service. Beneficiaries living outside
the 40-mile radius of the MTF are not required to obtain a nonavailability statement.
More than a third of the almost 6 million persons who are eligible for
CHAMPUS use its benefits annually at a government cost of nearly $3 billion. In
FY93, CHAMPUS expenditures were approximately $3.5 billion, nearly as much as
was spent on nonactive duty beneficiaries in the direct care system ($3.9 billion).
In 1987, in an effort to control spiraling health care costs, CHAMPUS
implemented a new payment system for acute hospital services. It was based on
a model established by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) for the
Medicare Prospective Payment System. CHAMPUS modified the model by utilizing
CHAMPUS claim data to develop weights and rates specific to it's beneficiary
population. A GAO review in 1990 found that over $200 million in savings in 1989
could be directly attributed to the new CHAMPUS payment approach.
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In the case of payments to physicians and other individual providers,
Congress directed in the DoD Appropriations Acts for 1991 through 1995, that
CHAMPUS payment limits be analyzed to identify overpriced procedures, compared
to Medicare, and that annual reductions of up to 15 percent in overpriced payment
limits be made. In May 1992, CHAMPUS began paying physicians based on
national prevailing charges, adjusted to reflect local economic conditions using
Medicare's Geographic Practice Cost Indices. Today, CHAMPUS payment levels
for many procedures are at or near Medicare Fee Schedule amounts. In order to
protect beneficiaries and avoid impairing access to care, the payment level
reductions can be waived if they would impair access. To provide financial
protection for beneficiaries, CHAMPUS limits balance billing by nonparticipating
providers to 115 percent of the allowable charge, the same as Medicare. [Ref. 4]
Within recent memory, several alternatives to the direct care system and
CHAMPUS have been implemented. The more familiar programs include: the
CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI) demonstrations; Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) site managed care initiatives; Tidewater Virginia (coordinated care)
demonstration project; PRIMUS/NAVCARE Clinics; and the Managed Care Support
Program Contract for California and Hawaii. [Ref. 6]
The rise of these health care reform initiatives can be attributed to ever
increasing health care costs and the problems inherent in the MHSS itself.
Historically, these problems have included [Ref. 6]:
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• Uneven access to care.
• Overcrowding in the MTFs.
• Maldistribution of health care resources.
• Duplication of effort among the military medical services.
• Lack of a standardized health benefits package.
• Decreased DoD funding levels.
• Beneficiary confusion concerning available health care options.
Armed with the lessons learned from it's previous health care initiatives and
faced with ever increasing health care costs and reduced funding, the DoD has
begun the monumental task of redesigning the MHSS through the implementation
ofTRICARE.
B. THE TRICARE PROGRAM
Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY94, directed DoD
to prescribe and implement a health benefit option for beneficiaries eligible for
health care under Chapter 55 of Title 10, United States Code. Specifically, the
program was to be modeled on Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) type plans
offered in the private sector. Additionally, beneficiaries who enroll in the health
benefit option, would have reduced out-of-pocket costs and a uniform benefit
structure. Congress further directed that the costs would be no greater than those
incurred to provide health care to the covered beneficiaries who enroll in the option.
With the advent of TRICARE, DoD found it necessary to "redesign" the
current health care delivery system. In it's redesign toward an HMO-like plan, DoD
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incorporated several new features into the MHSS. These new features include a
"Triple Option" for CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries; establishment of 12 Health
Service Regions (HSRs) within the United States; fixed price at-risk TRICARE
Support Contracts within each HSR; and a capitation-based resourcing allocation
system, to be discussed later in this chapter.
As previously mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this discussion will
primarily focus on the administrative and funding aspects of TRICARE, however
a discussion of TRICARE would not be complete without a brief overview of the
"Triple Option" offered to it's beneficiaries.
1. The "Triple Option"
TRICARE offers beneficiaries eligible for CHAMPUS three health care
delivery options. TRICARE Prime, which is similar to an (HMO) model; TRICARE
Extra, a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) type option; and TRICARE
Standard, which is the basic CHAMPUS program.
TRICARE Prime is available to all CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries.
Beneficiaries are enrolled in an HMO-like plan and obtain health care services
through an integrated network of civilian and military providers. Enrolled members
of the TRICARE Prime Option will pay an annual enrollment fee and reduced
CHAMPUS cost shares and copayments (point-of-service charges). Active duty
members are automatically enrolled in TRICARE Prime and there are no annual
fees for active duty members and their families. TRICARE Prime enrollees will also
have access to a Primary Care Manager (PCM). The PCM is responsible for
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coordinating patient referrals for health care within the integrated civilian and
military provider network. Additionally, enrollees will usually have no claim forms
to file. A point-of-service (POS) option is available under TRICARE Prime that
allows enrollees to go outside the established network. However, this decision
could involve payment of significant cost-shares and deductibles which could
exceed basic CHAMPUS costs.
TRICARE Extra is a preferred provider network which reduces the cost share
requirement more than the basic CHAMPUS program. Participants in this program
will not be enrolled and will obtain their care from providers through an established
civilian network, which has contracted with the government at a discounted rate.
Users of the basic CHAMPUS program do not have to enroll in TRICARE Extra and
may participate on a case-by-case basis. Also, beneficiaries have the added
benefit of not having to file their claims.
TRICARE Standard is the basic CHAMPUS program: Beneficiaries are not
required to be enrolled and have a greater choice in selecting their particular
provider. However, this option requires the payment of annual deductibles and
more costly copayments and cost-shares.
2. Regionally Managed Care
To implement and administer TRICARE, DoD has organized its medical
facilities into new health care regions and established a new administrative
structure to oversee the delivery of health care within the regions. MTFs are
organized on a geographic basis into 12 HSRs, encompassing the MTFs from all
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three Services. The number and Service affiliation of the facilities vary among
HSRs, as well as the number of eligible beneficiaries in each HSR. A medical
center commander within each HSR has been designated as the region's "Lead
Agent" and is supported by a joint-Service staff.
3. Lead Agents
Lead Agents are a critical component of the DoD health care program. Lead
Agents working cooperatively with all the Services' regional MTF commanders and
their staffs will be directly responsible for the development, implementation, and
management of the regional health plan for their MHSS beneficiaries, including the
development of an integrated health care network within their respective regions.
A Managed Care Support Contract, centrally procured by the TRICARE Support
Office (formerly OCHAMPUS), will provide the civilian provider network that will
augment MTF capabilities.
MTFs within each HSR retain their parent Services chain-of-command.
Consequently, each Service will retain their authority to make decisions regarding
direct care (MTF) operating funds, facility maintenance, and personnel actions.
Therefore, the lead agent does not control the funds that flow from the Services to
their respective facilities within the HSR or the CHAMPUS funds, which are
controlled by DoD and the contractor. Lead Agents, in effect, are coordinators who
attempt to ensure that MTFs in their region seek the most economical and efficient
care possible.
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Since the Lead Agent does not necessarily have the same Service affiliation
as the MTFs in the region, the specific responsibilities of Lead Agents can vary
among regions. However, the general purpose of the HSR concept is basically the
same for all regions. Some general responsibilities of Lead Agents [Ref. 6] are
listed below:
• Developing, in coordination with other regional commanders, the regional
health services plan.
• Developing a plan for delivery of care and services which ensures
continual improvement in pursuit of the goals of coordinated care.
• Developing regional policy for and coordinating patient referrals and
non-availability statements.
• Developing regional contract requirements for the Health Services
Region.
• Coordinating development of regional capitalization, maintenance and
repair/renovation plans.
• Conducting ongoing evaluations of resource utilization and access
throughout the Health Services Region.
Ultimately, the success of the TRICARE program will be dependent on the
Services' willingness and ability to work together to ensure the efficient and
effective execution of the regional health plan.
Table 1 on the following page presents information on the 12 HSRs, to
include the designated lead agents for each HSR, the states included in the HSR,
the estimated number of beneficiaries, and the number of military medical centers
and hospitals located within each HSR.
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CT, DE, D.C., ME,
MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY,
PA, Rl, VT, Northern
VA
1,093,918 12
2 Portsmouth Naval Hospital NC, Southern VA 872,011 8
3 Eisenhower Army
Medical Center
GA, SC, parts of FL 1,063,770 12
4 Keesler Air Force
Medical Center
AL,TN, parts of FL
and LA
595,024 10
5 Wright-Patterson Air Force
Medical Center
IL, IN, KY, Ml, OH,
WV, Wl
653,328 5
6 Wilford Hall Air Force
Medical Center
AR, OK, parts of LA
andTX
949,778 14
7 William Beaumont Army
Medical Center





CO, IA, KS, MN, MO,
MT, NE, ND, SD, UT,
WY, parts of ID
732,821 14
9 San Diego Naval Hospital Southern CA 710,461 7
10 David Grant Air Force
Medical Center
Northern CA 328,590 5
11 Madigan Army
Medical Center





Table 1. TRICARE Regional Breakdown. After [Ref. 1]
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4. Managed Care Support Contracts (MCSC)
Another major component of the TRICARE program is a series of seven
managed care support contracts that will supplement the capabilities of regional
military heath care delivery networks. These managed care support contracts are
procured centrally by the TRICARE Support Office (TSO), within the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), not by the lead agents of each
region. Lead agents provide input to the contract proposal for region-specific
requirements. In some cases, a single contract will be awarded for multiple regions
(i.e., single contracts will be awarded for HSRs 2 and 5, HSRs 3 and 4, HSRs 7 and
8, and HSRs 9, 10, and 12).
The contracts are bid on a competitive basis and considered fixed-price, at-
risk contracts. However, only the administrative portion of the contract has a fixed
price, while the health care price is subject to adjustments on the basis of risk-
sharing provisions in which the contractor and the government share contractor
losses and gains beyond a certain level. Price adjustments can be based on
factors such as inflation, beneficiary population, and MTF usage. The risk-sharing
and bid price adjustment features are intended to protect both the contractor and
the government from the large risks associated with these complex contracts.
Specifically, the contractors will develop networks of civilian providers
around the MTFs, facilitate locating providers for beneficiaries, perform utilization
management functions, process claims, provide beneficiary support functions, and
administrative support to the lead agent, MTF commanders, and staff.
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The contracts themselves are for a 5-year period (1 year plus 4 option
years), and DoD estimates that they will have a combined value of about $17
billion.
5. Specialized Treatment Services (STSs)
CHAMPUS beneficiaries in need of certain highly specialized high-cost
medical care will be referred to a designated national or regional military or civilian
treatment facility - a Specialized Treatment Services (STS) facility (catchment area
is 200 mile radius). The specific types of care to be covered (e.g., cancer
treatment, bone marrow transplants) and the sites at which specialized care must
be obtained will be announced annually by Health Affairs. A medical facility may
be designated as an STS based on it's record of readiness, access, quality, and
cost. Lead Agents may designate regional STSs as a component of their regional
health plans. An MTF commander can withhold a non-availability statement (NAS)
based on the availability of care at designated STS sites. [Ref. 6]
C. CAPITATION
As previously stated in Chapter I, DoD medical facilities were funded on the
basis of historical workload, which rewarded high resource utilization with increased
budgets. Simply stated, hospitals were rewarded with additional funds when they
increased their workload. This creates an incentive to provide additional services
without fully considering necessity of the service provided. With the shrinking of
defense dollars and the rise of medical expenditures, DoD is now focused on
capitation-based resource allocation.
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With capitation, there is no financial incentive to inappropriately increase the
number of services used or to provide more costly care, than is clinically
appropriate. Under a true capitation model, the Commander would assume the
responsibility (risk) for providing health care services to a defined population for a
fixed amount per beneficiary . Figure 2 presents a basic equation for determining
the capitated rate per beneficiary.
Total Health Care Resources
™^™^"^^^^^^^^^ Capitation Rate
User Beneficiary Population
Figure 2. Basic Capitation Equation
1. DoD Modified Capitation Model
In 1994, DoD adopted a modified capitation approach because funds for
some functions are not provided on a per capita basis. DoD's capitated allocation
is based on a two-step process. First, Health Affairs distributes DHP resources to
the Services' Medical Departments using a capitation methodology that was
developed in concert with Service representatives. Second, the Services' Medical
Departments pass the distributed resources to their individual MTFs using their own
Service-unique capitation methodologies. CHAMPUS funds are not provided to the
medical facilities but are pooled together at the Service-level to fund the TRICARE
managed support contracts in each region (Regions 1, 2, and 3 may be an
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exception due to alternative financing). The discussion that follows will center
upon the Health Affairs capitated model.
Health Affairs has established three components that determine a Service's
share of DHP resources and for setting the capitated rate. This model is a
population driven system that is designed to ensure funding directly for military
functions dealing with medical readiness. The three components of this model are:
Category I, Military Medical Support (not capitated); Category II, Military Medical
Unique Capitation Rate; and Category III, Medical Capitated Cost.
a. Category I - Military Medical Support
Military Medical Support are those services that are not capitated as
well as those services not directly related to the size of military force structure. The
following activities fall under Category I: Armed Forces Institute of Pathology,
overseas MTF and dental operations, Aeromedical Evacuation System, Military
Entrance Processing Command, Environmental Restoration/Compliance, and
Capital Expense Initial Outfitting. Resources distributed to the Services under
Category I are based on historical cost with an adjustment for inflation.
b. Category II - Military Medical Unique Capitation Rate
Category II, Military Medical Unique Capitation Rate, reflects those
costs associated with mission requirements which are Service unique. Activities
which support a larger number of active duty military receive an additive value to
the capitated rate since this category is actually based on the size of the Services'
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military force structure. In other words, Category II resource allocations are
determined by the number of active duty population served.
Category II is composed of two subcategories. Category IIA includes
readiness planning, physiological training flights and labs, military funded
emergency leave, readiness exercises and training, veterinary services, optical labs
and dental care. Category MB includes education and training.
c. Category III - Medical Capitated Cost
Category III is Medical Capitated Cost. This is similar to the rate seen
in HMOs and managed care plans in the private sector. Included in Category III are
stateside medical operations. Capitation in Category III is based on total
beneficiary user population served. For the most part, Categories I and II do not
apply to all MTFs.
Figure 3 presents the percentage of Defense Health Program
resources by category for FY96.
d. Defined Beneficiary Population
For Health Affairs, the defined catchment area (40 mile radius around
an MTF) population is determined by the number of estimated users vice eligible
beneficiaries. DoD acknowledges that it does not know the number of actual users
because it does not require beneficiaries to select and enroll in a single health care
plan. Therefore, Health Affairs, through the Defense Health Resources Study
Center (located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA) conducts a
questionnaire survey of MHSS beneficiaries semi-annually to gather various
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Figure 3. DHP Resources by Category. From [Ref. 7]
statistics on MHSS utilization. From this survey, Health Affairs can determine the
estimated number of users by Service, HSR, and MTF. Thus, for computing the
capitated rate, Health Affairs used an estimate of the number of actual users, based
on full-time equivalent (FTE) users of direct care and CHAMPUS. The three
Services, however, in formulating their "Service unique" capitation methodology,
used eligible beneficiaries vice actual users to help their MTFs transition to a
capitated system.
Without a universal enrollment system that would lock beneficiaries
into a single plan, beneficiaries may move freely between DoD sources of care,
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private insurers, or other programs such as Medicare and VA. The lack of a
universal enrollment system to identify the population that uses the MHSS also
makes it more difficult for lead agents and support contractors to create provider
networks and plan the medical services necessary to meet the health care needs
of the population using the MHSS. [Ref. 1]
D. INFORMATION SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT CAPITATION
The lack of adequate and timely information on health care has, over the
years, impeded several DoD initiatives to provide health care more cost effectively.
Existing cost accounting systems do not facilitate a true assessment and the
question of whether military health care providers are more cost effective relative
to those in the private sector becomes even more critical under capitation. MTF
commanders must be able to accurately define their beneficiary populations and
identify variations in the health care system in order to eliminate them. [Ref. 8]
This section will provide an overview of those information systems currently in use
and those planned for future deployment in support of capitation resource
allocation.
1 . Current Systems
a. Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS)
DEERS is a computer based enrollment/eligibility system used to
verify entitlement to a variety of DoD services to include eligibility for health care
services. Registration in DEERS is an MHSS requirement, regardless of the
TRICARE benefit option chosen. Health care benefits eligibility in DEERS are
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verified prior to the processing of any CHAMPUS and TRICARE claims. [Ref. 9]
DEERS registration, itself, is usually accomplished through local base Personnel
Offices.
b. Composite Health Care System (CHCS)
CHCS is a comprehensive medical information system designed and
developed to provide automated support to MTFs throughout the world. The
system is composed of integrated modules that activated either together or
independently, support high volume work areas within MTFs and enhance
communications between support areas that will be critical under a capitated
system. [Ref. 3]
CHCS comprises various modules that support a wide range of
hospital functions, such as pharmacy, laboratory, patient administration, medical
test results, and physician orders. A managed care program module has been
designed specifically to support TRICARE. This module is designed to track the
enrollment of beneficiaries in the Prime option, patient appointment bookings, and
patient referrals - functions needed at the outset of TRICARE implementation.
CHCS has experienced some technical and implementation delays, but several
sites are fully functional and DoD is continuing installation into MTFs nationwide.
[Ref. 8]
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c. Medical Expense Performance and Reporting Systems -
Expenses Assignment System III (MEPRS EAS III)
MEPRS EAS III provides consistent and uniform reporting of expense,
manpower, and workload data by fixed DoD medical and dental facilities at the
local, Service, and OSD levels. MEPRS is the only system that links expenses,
workload, and manpower data in a manner similar among the three Services.
[Ref. 3]
There are six major areas of care identified within MEPRS and each
of these are assigned an alpha character to identify the functional account:
Inpatient care (MEPRS A), Outpatient care (MEPRS B), Dental care (MEPRS C),
Ancillary Services (MEPRS D), Support Services (MEPRS E), and Special
Programs (MEPRS F).
Within each of the six major areas are the specialty accounts which
are called work centers. These work centers perform the services and collect the
MEPRS workload data. The MEPRS system tracks both workload and expense by
work center.
Man-hours are reported in MEPRS by Full Time Equivalents (FTEs).
One FTE represents one person working 168 hours per month. [Ref. 10]
MEPRs data are periodically forwarded by individual MTFs to a
centralized location for data processing and the generation and distribution of
various MEPRS reports.
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MEPRS ensures that the MHSS as a whole utilizes uniform
accounting principles, standardized terminology, uniform work performance
indicators, common classification of expenses by work center, and a common cost
assignment methodology. [Ref. 10]
d. Defense Medical Information System (DMIS)
DMIS provides a large repository of patient level population and
financial data to support the formulation and execution of plans, programs and
policies of the ASD(HA). It also supports the information needs of the Military
Departments' headquarters staff and health care analysts. DMIS is a centralized
non-deployed set of applications software and data bases that support the
collection, integration, validation, distribution, and analysis of MHSS data
concerning population, cost, utilization, and medical treatment data. DMIS data
sources include information provided directly from the Services, MTFs, DEERS,
MEPRS, TSO, and other sources. [Ref. 3]
e. Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System (RCMAS)
RCMAS is an application of DMIS and is a patient level, case-mix
analysis system that provides MTFs, intermediate commands, the Surgeons
General, and the OSD with timely access to clinical and management information.
RCMAS uses direct care, CHAMPUS, population, and clinical data to provide
statistics of observed versus expected workload and utilization trends. RCMAS
adjusts for age, gender, and case mix when analyzing beneficiary categories by
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG). This adjustment process will be discussed in
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more detail in Chapter III. Once the adjustments are made, the data can be used
to make resource allocation decisions. RCMAS also provides a geographic
mapping capability to display reports of population, nonavailability statements
(NASs), and utilization. [Ref. 3]
f. Resource Analysis and Planning System (RAPS)
RAPS is also an on-line computer analysis tool of DMIS that can
provide information on current and projected beneficiary populations (by active
duty, retired, etc) through the use of DEERS data and various algorithms. RAPS
also provides modeling and analytical tools to forecast military health care
beneficiary population, workload, and costs. The model enables users to estimate
and analyze the impact of alternative assumptions and policy decisions on resource
requirements. Proper identification of the population base is essential for
successful planning, programming, and execution in a capitated resource allocation
system. [Ref. 11]
g. CHAMPUS Actuarial Projection System (CAPS)
CAPS is a mainframe-based forecasting model that provides
CHAMPUS budget projections. CAPS makes separate forecasts of health care use
and unit costs. These forecasts are combined to create monthly, quarterly, and
fiscal year budget projections prospectively for five years. [Ref. 3]
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2. New Systems
a. The Ambulatory Data System (ADS)
ADS provides ambulatory (i.e., outpatient) data as a by-product of the
health care delivery process. Patient encounters are captured in sufficient detail
to support basic clinical and administrative purposes, including analyses for
managed care, epidemiological studies, billing, and severity/acuity case mix
analyses. Patient diagnostic and treatment data are incorporated into a single
record readily accessible by authorized users. Patient specific encounter data are
based on national coding systems and can provide for cost of care evaluations.
ADS automates the manual accumulation, analysis, and formatting of
workload reports based on Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) and International
Classification of Diseases (ICD) ambulatory care data. It expedites the collection
of outpatient ambulatory data and provides the capability to produce workload and
patient demographic reports. ADS will provide the patient-level workload data
currently missing for the ambulatory area and so essential to a managed care
system. As with all new information systems, it has faced implementation
difficulties, but has accelerated it's implementation schedule in 1996. [Ref. 12]
b. Corporate Executive Information Systems (CEIS)
CEIS will build upon and replace eight Legacy Systems (to include
DMIS, RCMAS, RAPS). CEIS will provide executive decision support information
across the entire MHSS using the data gathered from such sources as CHCS,
DEERS, and CHAMPUS. It will provide standard reports to address managed care
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concerns, such as; market assessment, health services utilization, financial
analysis, and quality improvement. In addition to standard reports, CEIS will
provide access to patient-level and aggregate data that can be accessed and
reported directly by the users. Several sites are currently testing a "proto-type" of
CEIS and full implementation is still several years away. [Ref. 13]
E. SUMMARY
This chapter provided background information on the MHSS, specifically the
structure and composition of the direct care system, CHAMPUS, and the TRICARE
program. It presented the methodology used in DoD's modified capitation allocation
system and an overview of the information systems currently used to support it, as
well as some of those planned for future deployment. Chapter III will provide the
definitions and discussion of those factors used in computing a transfer payment.
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III. FACTORS FOR COMPUTING TRANSFER PAYMENTS
A. GENERAL
Before the transfer payment methodology and calculations can be presented,
it is necessary to understand some of the components used in determining a
transfer payment. This chapter provides a discussion on diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs), length of stay (LOS), relative weighted products (RWPs), case-mix index
(CMI), and adjusted standardized amounts (ASAs).
1. Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG)
Medicare, from its inception in 1966 to 1983, made hospital payments based
on a retrospective system that reimbursed hospitals for all reasonable costs. At the
time, there was no real incentive to limit the amount or type of health care services
rendered to patients. In effect, Medicare provided hospitals with blank checks that
they could use to provide "gold-plated" services to Medicare beneficiaries. [Ref. 14]
On October 1, 1983, the apparent gross misuse and ever increasing
Medicare costs prompted the federal government to implement a prospective
payment system (PPS) for Part A (i.e., inpatient) Medicare reimbursement. The
newly adopted PPS reimbursed hospitals a fixed amount (initially based on hospital
costs at that time) for each admission based on the patient's diagnosis. If a hospital
proved to be efficient in providing required health care services, than it could retain
any excesses above the fixed reimbursable amount. Conversely, if the cost of care
for a patient exceeded the fixed reimbursable amount, the hospital would record a
loss. [Ref. 14]
35
The new PPS adopted by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
the agency responsible for administering Medicare, was developed at Yale
University by Fetter, Freeman and Thompson, called diagnosis- related groups
(DRGs). This new DRG-based payment methodology was designed to provide
incentives for cost containment which regulators believed would reduce length of
stay. Consequently, the Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) followed Medicare's lead and adopted the DRG
system in 1987. The federal statute authorizing the CHAMPUS DRG-based system
stipulated that it be "modeled" on the Medicare PPS, and that whenever practicable,
follow the same rules. [Ref. 15]
As previously mentioned, DRGs were designed to allow for a single fixed
(prospective) payment for each patient. This single payment includes the cost of
routine inpatient care, specialty care, and ancillary services. The exact amount of
the payment is based on the patient's DRG as assigned at discharge.
DRGs, themselves, are statistically significant medical groups that use
similar amounts and types of resources and are related in medical nature. They
are, in effect, a patient classification scheme that relates demographic, diagnostic,
and therapeutic characteristics of inpatient lengths of stay and amount of resources
consumed. It provides a framework for specifying hospital case-mix, and identifies
classifications of illnesses and injuries for which payment is made. [Ref. 11]
Simply stated, DRG codes attempt to capture the intricacies of an admission
through classification of the patient into a numeric category based on diagnosis.
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The starting point in determining the amount of reimbursement (or cost of
resources consumed) is the DRG itself. HCFA, when it adopted this system,
divided potential patient diagnoses into 25 (as of 1996) major diagnostic categories
(MDCs), which correspond to the major human organ systems. Within the 25 MDCs,
there are over 500 DRGs [Ref 14]. Table 2 provides a list of Medicare's ten most
frequently used DRGS in 1991.
1991 AVG LENGTH
DRG MDC RELATIVE OF STAY
DRG NAME NUMBER NUMBER WEIGHT (DAYS)
Heart Failure and Shock 127 5 1.0169 8.1
Angina pectoris 140 5 0.6387 7.8
Simple pneumonia, age > 17 89 4 1 .2059 9.2
Specific cerebrovascular disorders 14 1 1 .2260 11.2
Psychoses 430 19 0.9089 26.7
Esophagitis, age > 17 182 6 0.7417 6.4
Bronchitis and asthma with
complications, age > 17
96 4 0.9734 7.3
Major joint and limb procedures 209 8 2.3437 12.1
Nutritional and metabolic disorders
with complications, age > 17
296 10 0.9404 8.8
Cardiac arrhythmia with
complications
138 5 0.8707 6.2
Table 2. Ten Most Frequently Used DRGs for Medicare Patients. From [Ref. 14]
The DRG relative weights represent the average amount of resources
consumed in treating that particular diagnosis relative to the resources consumed
in treating the average diagnosis. "Resources consumed" refers to the average
hospital operating costs utilized in treating a particular DRG or group of DRGs.
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For example, the costs associated with DRG 209, major joint and limb
procedures, are over 2.3 times as much as the costs associated with the average
diagnosis (which would have a DRG relative weight of 1 .0). Conversely, DRG 140,
angina pectoris, would consume only about 64 percent of the resources required
for the average diagnosis. To account for changes in resource consumption,
treatment patterns, and technology, the DRG relative weights are adjusted and
published annually in the Federal Register. [Ref. 14]
2. Length of Stay (LOS) Trim Points
Another important factor when considering DRG relative weights and the
amount of resources consumed is length of stay (LOS). Medicare and OCHAMPUS
assign geometric mean lengths of stay and high and low lengths of stay trim points
to each DRG. The geometric mean lengths of stay and the length of stay trim
points are also published in the Federal Register annually.
The "geometric mean length of stay" represents the average amount of time
that a patient is expected to spend in the hospital based on the assigned DRG. The
"low length of stay trim" point is found by moving three standard deviations below
the geometric mean length of stay of the DRG. The vast majority of low length of
stay trim points have been found to equal one day. The "high length of stay trim
point" is similarly found by moving three standard deviations above the geometric
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Figure 4. Trim Points. From [Ref. 11]
Lengths of stay that fall in between the high and low length of stay trim points
(± 3 standard deviations) are considered "inliers". Lengths of stay that fall below
the low length of stay trim point are considered low length of stay outliers; lengths
of stay that fall above the high length of stay trim point are considered high length
of stay outliers. [Ref. 11]
3. Relative Weighted Product (RWP)
The "Central Retrospective Case-Mix Analysis System (RCMAS)" information
system, as previously discussed in Chapter II, supports DoD's health care resource
analysis requirements. One of the functionalities of RCMAS includes the
assignment of a relative weighted product (RWP) to each patient disposition based
on the disposition's DRG weight and length of stay trim points associated with the
DRG. The RWP itself is a workload and resource allocation measure that
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quantifies the relative resource consumption (operating costs utilized) of a
disposition.
The amount of RWP (relative resources consumed) assigned to a particular
disposition with an assigned DRG is calculated as follows: (1) An inlier patient
disposition would be assigned an RWP amount equal to the DRG's relative weight;
(2) A low length of stay outlier disposition would be assigned an RWP amount that
is less than the DRG's relative weight, but equal to 200% of the per diem weight for
each day, not to exceed the assigned DRG relative weight. Per diem weight is
found by dividing the DRG's relative weight by the geometric mean length of stay;
(3) A high length of stay outlier disposition would be assigned an RWP amount
equal to the DRG's weight plus 60% of the per diem weight for each day that
exceeds the high length of stay trim point.
Figure 5 presents a graphic view of the RWP calculations for short and long
length of stay outliers and their relationship to the inlier length of stay, which equals
the DRG relative weight.
To better illustrate RWP calculations and the resulting RWP amount
assigned to a patient disposition, the following example is provided below. [Ref. 1 1 ]
Given the DRG, DRG relative weight, and LOS values originally assigned by TSO:
DRG 392 Splenectomy, age > 17
DRG weight 1.9746
Low length of stay trim point 2 days
High length of stay trim point 23 days
Geometric mean length of stay 7.6 days
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If the length of stay was between 2 and 23 days, this would be classified
as an inlier disposition. An Inlier disposition for DRG 392 would receive
an RWP value equal to the DRG weight of 1 .9746. Therefore, RCMAS
would automatically assign a RWP of 1 .9746 to this disposition
A low length of stay outlier would be any disposition for DRG 392 that had
a length of stay less than 2 days. A low length of stay outlier of one day
would be assigned a RWP amount equal to:
[(1 .9746/7.6) x 2.0] x 1 = 0.51 96 RWP
A high length of stay outlier of 27 days (four days over the high length of
stay trim point) would be assigned a RWP amount equal to:
1 .9746 + [((1 .9746/7.6) x 0.60) x 4] = 2.5982 RWP










INLIER - DRG WEIGHT
LONG STAY OUTLIER -
DRG WEIGHT + 60%
PER DIEM FOR DAYS
OVER TRIM POINT
LENGTH OF STAY
Figure 5 RWP Calculations. From [Ref. 11]
The above examples and calculations illustrate how RWPs are used as a
measure of relative resource consumption. If a disposition falls within the high and
low LOS trim points of a particular DRG, then the relative resources expended for
that disposition is comparable to the average resources usually consumed for that
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particular DRG. Therefore, the RWP assigned to the disposition is the DRG's
relative weight. Similarly, low length of stay outlier dispositions utilize less
resources and high length of stay outliers utilize more resources than the average
for a particular DRG. Thus, the amount of the RWP assigned for a low length of
stay outlier will always be less than the DRG's relative weight and the RWP
assigned for a high length of stay outlier will always be greater than the DRG's
relative weight.
4. Case-Mix Index (CMI)
The case-mix index (CMI) is a useful tool for judging the types of diagnoses
(i.e., complexity) that are being treated at a particular hospital or MTF. The index
represents the average DRG relative weight for all patients treated in a specific
period. The average or expected CMI value for a given set of dispositions is 1 .0.
To illustrate the concept, the 1990 case-mix index for North Ridge Medical Center
in Fort Lauderdale was 1.775, while that of De Soto Memorial Hospital in Arcadia,
Florida, was 0.840. This example indicates that North Ridge Medical Center is
treating much more complex cases requiring greater resources than is De Soto
Memorial Hospital. [Ref. 14]
Using RCMAS, the accumulated RWPs are used to calculate the CMI. As
previously stated (see Table 2), a relative weighted value of 1.0 indicates the
expected or standard complexity (hence, the expected amount of resources
consumed) for a given set of dispositions, while values less than 1 .0 indicate that
the caseload was less complex than expected. The CMI can be computed for an
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entire MTF's dispositions or for an individual DRG's total dispositions. Conversely,
values greater than 1.0 indicate that the caseload was more complex than
expected. The CMI is computed by dividing the summed RWPs for all dispositions
in an MTF by the number of dispositions. A CMI can also be calculated for a
specific DRG or groups of DRGs. A CMI for a particular DRG is computed by
dividing the aggregate RWPs for all dispositions for that DRG by the number of
those dispositions. [Ref. 11]
5. Adjusted Standardized Amounts (ASA)
Although "adjusted standardized amount" (ASA) is a relatively new term on
the direct care side of the MHSS, the concept is basically modeled after current
Medicare and CHAMPUS procedures.
Hospitals are grouped into Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and
classified by the HCFA as falling into one of three locational categories: large
urban, other urban, or rural. Forty-six urban areas across the country are classified
as "large urban", while the smaller urban areas retain the "other urban"
classification. Hospitals outside of urban areas are classified as "rural".
Additionally, the HCFA developed and promulgated local area wage indices to
account for area wage adjustments (i.e., labor costs).
This classification system allows the HCFA and TSO, in essence, to
establish standardized rates for inpatient billing. Standardized labor and non-labor
costs per discharge are published annually in the Federal Register by the HCFA
based on locational classifications for nine census areas as well as a national




Large Urban $2,532 $1 ,043
Other Urban $2,491 $1 ,026
Rural $2,451 $790
Table 3. HCFA National Average Standardized Costs per
Discharged Patient by Locational Category.
From [Ref. 14]
As an example, Table 4 illustrates a Medicare reimbursement computation
for DRG 127 (heart failure and shock) for a Miami, Florida, hospital, which is
classified as a large urban hospital. The national large urban labor amount for
DRG-127, $2,532, is first adjusted by the local area wage index (TSO uses
Medicare's indices). This product, which is the labor amount adjusted for area
wage rates, is then added to the national non-labor costs. The result is the
adjusted standardized amount (ASA), $3,631 , which is the hospital's base rate that
is applied to all diagnoses. Finally, the adjusted hospital rate is multiplied by the
DRG relative weight to obtain the reimbursement amount. In our illustration, the
DRG relative weight is 1.0169, which produces a DRG payment of $3,692. [Ref. 14]
The final Medicare or CHAMPUS PPS payment may be further adjusted for
various reasons such as indirect medical education (operating costs that arise
because of medical education). Separate payments may also be calculated for
direct medical education costs (salaries for interns, residents, teaching personnel,
etc.) and capital-related costs (depreciation, interest, lease, and rental expenses).
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Area wage index for Miami.
DRG
DRG relative weight
Large urban labor amount $2,532
Multiplied by area wage index X 1.0223
Adjusted labor amount $2,588
Plus non-labor amount + $1,043
Adjusted hospital rate $3,631
Multiplied by DRG relative weight X 1.0169
Hospital reimbursement $3,692
Table 4. Example of Medicare DRG Payment.
From [Ref. 14]
Note that Medicare reimburses capital-related expenses prospectively (fixed
amount) while CHAMPUS reimburses those costs on a retrospective basis (actual
costs). [Ref. 15]
The DoD (Health Affairs), using a methodology similar to the HCFA
approach, recently developed ASA rates for the direct care portion of the MHSS.
The ASA methodology would allow for a direct comparison in cost efficiency
between MTFs; and between MTFs and private-sector facilities. ASAs themselves
represent the adjusted average operating costs for treating all beneficiaries in the
direct care system in all DRGs during a selected period of time [Ref. 16]. The
following paragraphs describe the methodology used by Health Affairs in
determining ASAs.
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First, CONUS (continental U.S.) MTFs were grouped into three locational
categories; Large Urban (27 MTFs) , Other Urban (55 MTFs), or Rural (23 MTFs).
Second, DoD aggregate cost data from the MEPRS-A account (inpatient)
and MEPRS-F account (Special Programs) were utilized to determine the labor
(military and civilian) and non-labor costs for the three locational categories.
Additionally, adjustments were made for indirect and general medical education
(GME, or direct medical education), inflation, and asset use (capital-related
expenses). These resultant "full cost" ASAs include all expenses (labor and non-
labor) associated with Category III activities under capitation budgeting. [Ref. 17]
The ASA rate for the three locational groups in FY95 are shown in Table 5 below.
ASA GROUP LABOR NON-LABOR ASA RATE
Large Urban $2,767 $1,141 $3,908
Other Urban $3,021 $1 ,246 $4,267
Rural $3,830 $1 ,236 $5,066
Table 5. Adjusted Standardized Amount (ASA) rate. From [Ref. 17]
The ASA rates, above, have been further applied in the determination of
specific MTF ASA rates. MTF specific ASA rates were obtained by making further
cost adjustments for the cost of local indirect medical education (IME) and area
wage adjustments. Appendix A provides a list of individual MTF FY95 ASA rates
[Ref. 2].
Thus, ASAs facilitate a uniform approach to DRG costing and inpatient billing
and make the direct care portion of the MHSS more comparable to CHAMPUS and
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Medicare (incidentally, the ASA rates could feasibly facilitate reimbursements from
Medicare for those eligible patients who receive MHSS benefits).
B. SUMMARY
This chapter provided a discussion on some of the factors that are utilized
in a prospective payment system (PPS) and on how these factors relate to relative
resource consumption in the determination of a PPS payment. Specifically
discussed were diagnosis related groups (DRG), length of stay (LOS), relative
weighted products (RWPs), the case-mix index (CMI), and adjusted standardized
amounts (ASAs).
Consider three cases of DRG 392, Splenectomy age>17, one disposition is
below the mean length of stay (LOS), one is within the mean, and one is above.
Table 6 provides a summary of each factor and their relationship to each other and
Table 7 demonstrates how a reimbursement would be computed for a MTF and
Medicare, respectively. It is important to note that under the transfer payment
methodology, MTFs would use the base DRG relative weight to compute the
number of RWPs, while Medicare would adjust the number of RWPs for outliers.
Chapter IV will discuss how these factors relate to the current transfer
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As the MHSS transitions to a fully capitated system, significant policy issues
become apparent. One of these significant policy issues is the transfer payment
concept, which is specifically unique to the military. Health Affairs has defined
transfer payments as being a "major component of the MHSS capitation-based
resource allocation system". [Ref. 18]
Although the transfer payment policy has not been fully implemented as of
this date, this chapter will discuss the tenets of the policy and methodology as
published by Health Affairs and Chapter V will discuss some of the possible
implications for the MHSS.
B. THE NEED FOR TRANSFER PAYMENTS
1. Limited Resources
As discussed in Chapter II, under true capitation, all beneficiaries wishing to
use the MHSS would be enrolled with only one MTF and that MTF commander
would then assume the responsibility for providing care health services to that
enrolled population, for a fixed amount per beneficiary. If an enrolled patient
required health care services beyond the capability of the MTF, a payment would
be made to another health care provider or medical facility to obtain the required
health care.
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Under the current modified capitation resourcing methodology, an MTF
commander is responsible and funded for providing health services to a defined but
not enrolled population. Additionally, the DoD modified capitation approach uses
historical data and costs to determine the appropriate level of allocated funding.
If historical data and costs are utilized, then an MTF which provided referral
services in the past is already resourced for those services at that historical level.
For example, if Hospital A previously provided inpatient health care services
for 100 patients referred from Hospital B and 50 patients from Hospital C, then
Hospital A would receive the necessary resources (funds) in their capitated
allocation to continue providing care to those 150 patients.
Another factor to consider under a modified capitation system is that the user
population of an MTF does not necessarily reside in a defined catchment area
(40 mile radius of the MTF) for which that MTF commander is responsible. Since
military beneficiaries are not enrolled as they are in civilian managed care plans,
they are free to seek health care services at any MTF. Also, as seen in the above
example, MTFs may refer patients out to other MTFs for their required health care,
if needed. Therefore, beneficiaries may receive services at MTFs outside of the
catchment area in which they live.
As previously noted, MTFs have funds in their base to treat a majority of
these patients based on their historical level of referrals from outside their facility.
However, if a noncatchment area beneficiary received care from an MTF and was
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not included in the MTF's original base, then a transfer of funds should occur to
offset the MTF's additional cost. [Ref. 2]
From our above example, it was pointed out that Hospital A was resourced
for 150 patients referred from Hospital B and C, but Hospital A is not resourced for
the151st patient referred from either of those facilities.
2. Cost Shifting
With a modified capitation resource allocation system, there is an incentive
to shift beneficiaries to other components of the MHSS. Workload shifts, whether
the result of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) driven population changes,
clinical referral patterns or managed care decisions, could adversely affect the
operating costs of referral centers and result in "windfall profits" to referring
facilities. [Ref. 2]
Consider an interesting phenomenon that occurred prior to the
implementation of DoD-wide capitation in FY94 (the U.S. Army started capitating
their MTFs in FY93). Health Affairs, after reviewing MHSS workload data from FY92
to FY93, observed the following:
Based upon the changes in total relative weighted product (RWP)
workload, the impact of the capitation incentive is apparent in the
marked difference in percent reductions in workload among the three
Services. The Army (almost all under capitation in FY93) reduced
their RWP workload by 16%, far exceeding the decrease in
population, while the other two Services reduced their overall
inpatient workload by 4% and 5%. This tends to prove that capitation
has a fairly early impact on workload planning and clinical decision
making.
Also, some of the workload reduced by the Army appears to have
shown up in Air Force and Navy MTFs. Further analysis may reveal
that some portion of the Army reduction is due to the reduction of long
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stay "outlier" RWPs as the Army clinicians began to reduce lengths
of stay. Also, some of the reductions may be due to legitimate
utilization management initiatives (changing inpatient surgery to the
ambulatory setting), but as stated above, there may have been some
cost shifting from the Army to the other two Services (who probably
welcomed the workload under their FY93 workload based budget).
Some of this reduction could have been legitimate utilization
reductions (the Army reduced their own catchment workload by 14%
and their own non-catchment workload by 26%), but without the same
incentive at Air Force and Navy hospitals, some of the workload may
have shifted. [Ref 19]
If MTF commanders are to be fully responsible for the total health care costs
of a defined population, the appropriate incentives must be placed upon MTFs to
prevent workload shifting and to encourage aggressive management of referrals.
The transfer payment policy addresses high volume, low cost outpatient and
ancillary referrals (e.g., central clinical labs.), but pertains primarily to inpatient
referrals, which represent approximately $450 million (FY93) of the DHP.
Outpatient and ancillary referral patterns are to be managed by the
responsible regional lead agent in coordination with the affected MTF(s) and
Service(s). Any reimbursements will occur only after a mutually agreed upon
workload baseline has been exceeded.
Transfer payments, then, are designed to facilitate the transfer of funds for
inpatient referrals exceeding a historically funded level and provides a mechanism
for referral MTFs to recoup their full average cost of providing additional services.
The transfer payment policy is the mechanism to transfer Operations &
Maintenance (O&M) funding between MTFs and Services for inpatient referral
services and is intended as a resource allocation/leveling mechanism; not a
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fee-for-service system. In other words, the policy, as currently written, is intended
to "move funds to where the care is provided" [Ref 2].
To implement the transfer payment policy and concepts just described, a
methodology was developed that utilized existing information systems in the
creation of MTF specific costs per RWP and two baselines for each MTF.
C. BASELINES
Our discussion of the transfer payment methodology begins with defining
baselines. Inpatient referral workload baselines for each MTF have been
established utilizing historical data from RCMAS. Workload data from FY93 was
adjusted for population changes (i.e., BRAC, changes in health care services
rendered) and used to determine FY95 MTF RWP baselines. Appendix A provides
the individual MTF FY95 notional (suggested) RWP baselines as published by
Health Affairs (FY96 baselines have not been published). The Military Departments
can adjust the notional baselines for their MTFs, but must submit those adjustments
to Health Affairs for approval prior to an established deadline.
As previously discussed, baselines do not represent the actual number of
referrals, but their aggregate value in RWPs. All baselines are expressed in terms
of base relative weighted products (RWP). The base RWP for a diagnosis related
group (DRG) is the RWP or relative weight assigned to that DRG and does not
include additional RWPs for outlier cases. There are two inpatient baselines
established for each MTF; a receivable and a payable baseline.
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1. Receivable MTF Baseline
Although the terminology may seem confusing2
,
the receivable baseline is
simply the amount of inpatient workload an MTF may refer out to another MTF
without having to pay that facility. In effect, it is a transfer out of RWPs. You may
also think of it as representing the amount of "referral credit" an MTF has with the
direct care part of the MHSS and also as the medical care it's beneficiaries were
historically entitled to receive from other MTFs. Remember, the cost of care for
those referrals was included in the medical capitated allocation of the referral MTF.
Referring MTFs pay for care only if their total receivable baseline is exceeded.
For example, Hospital A's receivable baseline, expressed in RWPs, is
524.98. Therefore, Hospital A may refer out up to 524.98 RWPs to other MTFs
before Hospital A is required to make a transfer payment to other MTFs.
Incentives do exist for MTF commanders to fully utilize their entire RWP
receivable baseline. The receivable baseline can be optimized by referring out only
necessary and cost effective care. Thus, those MTFs which can reduce their
receivable baseline requirements (i.e., through utilization management) will have
"excess" referral credit available within the direct care system. This excess or
unused capacity in MTFs can then be employed to capture current CHAMPUS
workload.
2Note that OASD/HA uses "transfer payment" to describe the concept for
calculating a price which is either paid or due from another organization. Technically
an amount due is a receipt. In this thesis, the term transfer payment is used in the
broader meaning to identify either a payment or receipt.
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2. Payable MTF Baseline
This baseline is the amount of inpatient care an MTF may provide to
noncatchment and other MTF catchment area beneficiaries without a transfer
payment receipt. In effect, it is a transfer in of RWPs.
The RWP payable baseline represents the relative workload in providing
health care services by MTF on behalf of other MTFs or for beneficiaries living
outside catchment areas. This RWP payable baseline actually consists of two
types of workload -- inpatient health care services provided to noncatchment area
beneficiaries on behalf of a Military Department and inpatient health care services
provided to other MTF catchment area beneficiaries.
3. Illustration of Receivable and Payable Baselines
Figure 6 provides an illustration of the baseline concept for Camp Swampy.
The numbers contained within the dashed line area represent the RWPs
accumulated (relative workload) in providing inpatient health care services at Camp
Swampy. Thus, inpatient services provided at Camp Swampy accumulated a total
of 1494.13 RWPs, however 222.4 RWPs were from "noncatchment" areas and
140.15 RWPs were referred into Camp Swampy "from other MTFs" (The 980.3
RWPs for CHAMPUS are independent from the baselines).
The Camp Swampy RWPs accumulated under "Noncatchment" and "From
Other MTFs" represent the total payable baseline, (222.4 + 140.15) = 362.55 RWP
payable baseline. The line titled "To Other MTFs" represents Camp Swampy's
total relative workload (760.88 RWPs) that was referred out to other MTFs. These
57
760.88 RWPs represent Camp Swampy's total receivable baseline (i.e., credit with
the direct care system). Figure 7 provides a summary of the illustration.
ILLUSTRATION OF
CATCHMENT AREA BASELINES
INPA TIENT BASE RWP FOR CAMP SWAMPYAH
CATCHMENT NONCATCHMENT FROM OTHER MTFs









NONCATCHMENT + FROM OTHER MTFs = PAYABLE BASELINE = 362.55
TO OTHER MTFs = RECEIVABLE BASELINE = 760.00










FROM OTHER MTFs 140.15
PAYABLE BASELINE 362.55
CATCHMENT AREA 1.131.58 1,131.58





TOTAL CATCHMENT AREA 2.872.76
Figure 7. Summary of Catchment Area Baselines
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To assist MTF commanders, lead agents, and other interested parties in
tracking the RWPs for receivable and payable baselines, the RCMAS system
provides a standard report format for each MTF's baseline data for the current year.
This standard report is titled "Patient Origin and RWP Summary". A copy of the
report is provided in Appendix B.
D. WHEN WILL TRANSFER PAYMENTS OCCUR?
As discussed in the previous section, RWP receivable and payable
baselines are calculated, approved and established annually for each individual
MTF. The next question to answer is how do the receivable and payable baselines
determine when a transfer payment is necessary? The calculation of the actual
transfer payment (i.e., dollar amount) will be discussed in a later section of the
chapter while this section will focus upon when a transfer payment will be required,
in accordance with current policy.
Basically, MTFs "trigger" a transfer payment or receipt when they exceed
their RWP receivable or payable baselines. There are several possible scenarios
that could occur to bring about a transfer payment or receipt.
To simplify the discussion, various case studies will be presented using three
hypothetical MTFs, one from each Service, within one TRICARE Health Service
Region (HSR). It should be noted that the case studies could be applied to several
MTFs across several HSRs.
Figure 8 presents three MTFs, a U.S. Air Force (USAF) Hospital, (USA)
Hospital, and a U.S. Navy (USN) Medical Center located in fairly close proximity to
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Receivable Baseline = 365.45 RWPs
Payable Baseline =247.11 RWPs
ffllWaStlgiJ
USN MEDICAL CENTER
Receivable Baseline = 417.99 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 5,838.25 RWPs
Figure 8. Receivable and Payable Baselines of Three MTFs
each other within HSR 13. Assume that the USN Medical Center is a much larger
medical facility than the others. The individual MTF receivable and payable
baselines were approved by Health Affairs on January 1st of the current year.
Upon further review of Figure 8, one notices that the USAF Hospital has a
rather large receivable baseline (524.98 RWPs) relative to it's payable baseline
(67.44 RWPs) and that the USN Medical Center has a large payable baseline
(5,838.25 RWPs) relative to it's receivable baseline (417.99 RWPs).
The larger receivable baselines for the USAF and USA hospitals are
consistent with the fact that smaller facilities have limited capabilities and must refer
more complex cases out to larger tertiary care facilities, such as the USN Medical
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Center. Conversely, large tertiary care facilities that offer a broad range of health
care services, such as the USN Medical Center, tend to have large payable
baselines (transfers in of RWPs) relative to their receivable baselines (transfers out
of RWPs).
1. Referring MTF Exceeds Receivable Baseline
Now suppose that over the course of the current year, the USAF Hospital
has referred a number of patients to the USN Medical Center and have calculated
their "transferred" relative workload to equal 600 RWPs. Similarly, the USA
Hospital has calculated their referrals to the USN Medical Center to equal 300
RWPs. Figure 9 presents the current situation as Case Study #1
.
In this case, the USAF Hospital has exceeded it's receivable baseline by
75.02 RWPs (600 - 524.98 = 75.02 RWPs), but the USA Hospital is still under it's
receivable baseline by 65.45 RWPs (365.45 - 300 = 65.45 RWPs). The USN
Medical Center, after subtracting out the RWPs from the other two MTFs, is still
under it's payable baseline by 4,938.25 RWPs (5,838.25 - 600 - 300 = 4938.25
RWPs). Although the USN Medical Center has more than enough RWPs left under
it's payable baseline to perform additional referral workload, the USAF Hospital
should still transfer funds to reimburse the USN Medical Center for a total of 75.02
RWPs. Thus, a transfer payment will always be triggered when a referring MTF's
total receivable baseline is exceeded, even though the referral MTF's total payable
baseline may not have been exceeded.
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HEALTH SERVICE REGION 13
USAF Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 524.98 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 67.44 RWPs
USA Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 365.45 RWPs
Payable Baseline =247.11 RWPs
USAF Hospital is
600 - 524.98 = 75.02 RWPs
Over Receivable Baseline
USN Medical Center
Receivable Baseline = .417.99 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 5,838.25 RWPs
Figure 9. Case Study #1. USAF Hospital Exceeds Receivable Baseline
Current policy states that once a referring MTF (the USAF Hospital) exceeds
it's receivable baseline, that the referring MTF should begin computing the dollar
value of accrued referrals that fall into this category using the referral MTF's
transfer payment price. During scheduled reviews by higher authority headquarters
(monthly or quarterly per Military Department discretion), this dollar amount will
potentially be withdrawn from the referring MTF's O&M allocation and distributed
to referral MTFs that have exceeded their payable baselines. [Ref. 2] Although the
current policy is still somewhat vague about when and how the actual transfer of
funds will take place, a transfer payment will always occur in this particular
situation.
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2. Referral MTF Exceeds Payable Baseline
A transfer payment will also be triggered when a referral MTF's total payable
baseline is exceeded but the referring MTF has not exceeded its total receivable
baseline.
Figure 10 presents Case Study #2 which is a slightly different scenario with
the addition of referrals "from other MTFs" (other than the USAF and USA hospitals)
and "noncatchment areas". Additionally, note that the USAF and USA hospitals
are still under their current receivable baselines.
HEALTH SERVICE REGION 13
USAF Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 524.98 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 67.44 RWPs
USA Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 365.45 RWPs




i USN Medical Center
Receivable Baseline = 417.99 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 5,838.25 RWPs
500 + 300 + 5500 = 6300
6300-5838.25 = 461.75
USN MED CTR IS:
461 .75 RWPs Over It's
Payable Baseline
%*-
Figure 10. Case Study #2. USN MEDCEN Exceeds Payable Baseline
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In Case Study #2, the USN Medical Center has provided services to referred
patients from the USAF Hospital, USA Hospital, "other MTFs" and "noncatchment
areas", that equal RWPs of 500, 300, and 5500, respectively, for a total of 6,300
RWPs. Therefore, the USN Medical Center has exceeded it's established payable
baseline by 461 .75 RWPs (6,300 - 5,838.25 = 461 .75 RWPs). The USN Medical
Center, in essence, is being asked to provide care for which it may not have funds
(total payable baseline is exceeded) and the referring MTFs are not required to pay
since they are still below their receivable baselines. The total number of patient
referrals from the USAF Hospital, USA Hospital, "other MTFs" and noncatchment
areas contributed to the USN Medical Center exceeding it's total payable baseline.
Similar to the transfer payment concepts highlighted in the previous case,
the referral MTF's (i.e., USN Medical Center) Military Department may require the
referral MTF to begin computing the dollar value of accrued referrals (transfers in)
using it's transfer payment price. Although, in this case, it is less clear "who" should
pay for these additional RWPs, the referral MTF should subsequently receive O&M
funding commensurate with it's accrued "earnings."
3. When Both Receivable and Payable Baselines are Exceeded
Figure 1 1 presents Case Study #3, the final scenario that will be discussed
in this section. A transfer payment will always be triggered when both the total
receivable baseline of a referring MTF and the payable baseline of the referral MTF
have been exceeded.
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HEALTH SERVICE REGION 13
USAF Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 524.98 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 67 44 RWPs
USA Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 365.45 RWPs















Receivable Baseline = 417.99 RWPs
Payable Baseline 5,838.25 RWPs
600 + 400 + 5500 = 6500
6500-5838.25 = 661.75
USN MEDCEIM IS
661 .75 RWPs Over it's
Payable Baseline
Figure 11. Case Study #3. Referring and Referral MTF Exceeds Baselines
As shown in Figure 1 1 , the USAF and USA hospitals have exceeded their
receivable baselines by 75.02 and 34.55 RWPs, respectively. This effect,
combined with the 5500 RWPs from "other MTFs" and "noncatchment areas", have
contributed to the USN Medical Center exceeding it's payable baseline by 661.75
RWPs.
Since the receivable baselines of both referring MTFs (USAF and USA
hospitals) were exceeded, both MTFs will have to reimburse (i.e., transfer payment)
the referral MTF (USN Medical Center) an amount commensurate with the RWPs
exceeding their respective baselines. In this case, the MTF providing the care
(USN Medical Center) for which the patient was referred is responsible to initiate
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billing. Again, the procedures to accomplish the actual transfer of funds are still
under review (a date for resolution has not been set).
4. Managed Care Support (MCS) Contracts
Currently, the transfer payment policy states, "Since the MCS contractor is
an extension of the MTF when caring for CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries, the
transfer payment policy should directly affect a contractor when the referral MTF
has exceeded its payable baseline" [Ref. 2].
Although this part of the policy is still under review, the reasoning behind the
policy statement is that if an MTF had to make a referral, then the referring MTF
would ultimately would have had to use direct care O&M funds for the patient's care
anyway -- either by continuing to provide the care in the MTF, initiating a transfer
payment to another MTF, or by issuing a nonavailability statement (NAS, i.e.,
approval to use CHAMPUS). The issuance of a NAS could increase the price of
the MCS contract beyond the CHAMPUS baseline and that financial responsibility
would then be allocated back to the MTF through the informal bid price adjustment
reports. [Ref. 2]
For example, if MTF B has already exceeded it's payable baseline, then the
MCS contractor would pay MTF B for any additional services beyond MTF B's
payable baseline. Conversely, if MTF B is still below it's payable baseline, then the
MCS contractor would not have to pay. Subsequently, the bid price adjustment
would be adjusted to reduce any contractor gains (increase loss). Discussion of the
bid price adjustment is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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5. Specialized Treatment Services (STS)
The use of the specialized treatment service (STS) by a MCS contractor may
involve inter-region referrals (STSs have a 200 mile catchment area). Similar to the
previous situation, the MCS contractor will not have to pay the STS facility for
speciality service inpatient care if the STS facility is not over its total payable
baseline. However, under current STS operating policy, a NAS will be issued even
if the STS facility is over its payable baseline (since STS facilities were designed
to capture expensive CHAMPUS cases).
If a NAS was issued by an MTF and the STS facility exceeds its payable
baseline, the MCS contractor will consider the STS facility as the preferred source
of health care (if the required specialty care applies). The MCS contractor must
then give the STS facility the right of first refusal, provided the cost of the speciality
service is less than the civilian cost of the speciality service. [Ref. 2]
Thus, transfer payments will be made when: a referring MTF exceeds it's
receivable baseline; when a referral MTF exceeds it's payable baseline; and when
both the referring MTF exceeds it's receivable baseline and referral MTF exceeds
it's payable baseline. Additionally, the MCS contractor is included in the transfer
payment methodology and will similarly make a payment under the circumstances
described above.
This section discussed how baselines are used in determining when a
transfer payment is required. The following section discusses the methods and
calculations used in determining the actual "dollar" amount of the transfer payment.
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E. THE TRANSFER PAYMENT PRICE
As discussed in Chapter III, an FY95 adjusted standardized amount (ASA)
per RWP has been developed and calculated by Health Affairs for each individual
MTF and is listed in Appendix A. Recall, that the individual MTF ASAs represent
the adjusted operating costs for treating all beneficiaries in the direct care system
in all DRGs at individual MTFs. These "full cost" ASAs include all expenses (labor
and non-labor) associated with Category III activities under capitation budgeting.
For all practical purposes, the individually calculated ASA rates are an MTF's
average cost per RWP (regardless of DRGs).
MTFs have the option of developing their own specific MTF transfer payment
price per RWP, but it must be more than the MTF's marginal cost3
,
less than the
MTF's ASA cost, less than CHAMPUS average cost, and contain all costs (O&M
and Military Personnel pay). If an MTF develops it's own specific transfer price per
RWP in lieu of the ASA rate that was provided, the following methodology could
be employed.
The Case Mix Index (CMI) was defined in Table 6 (Chapter III) as a tool that
could be used to judge the types of diagnoses (i.e., complexity) being treated at a
particular hospital or MTF. The CMI for an MTF is calculated by dividing the
summed RWPs for all dispositions in an MTF by the number of dispositions. An
3 Health Affairs did not specifically define "marginal costs". Some interpret
marginal costs to mean "variable costs" or the incremental cost of producing one
additional unit of output (i.e., patient).
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average RWP per disposition may be calculated for an MTF as a whole as shown
by Equation 1
.
(CMI) X (NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS) = RWP
Equation 1 . RWP Calculation
The MTF's cost per RWP can also be calculated, but not as easily. First, the
MTF has to determine it's marginal costs. At the present time, most MTFs do not
have a patient level cost accounting system and must rely on other sources of
information, such as MEPRS, to assist them in determining their estimates of
marginal costs. If an MTF was able to gather the relevant marginal cost data, then
Equation 2 could be used to determine the marginal cost per RWP.
(MARGINAL COSTS) / (RWP) = COST PER RWP
Equation 2. Cost Per RWP
Once the MTF has determined it's marginal cost per RWP, it must then
adjust it upward (amount adjusted depends on the MTF's objective) because the
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MTF's derived average cost per RWP, as stated earlier, must be greater than it's
marginal cost, less than the ASA cost, and less than the CHAMPUS average cost.
Figure 12 is Case Study #4. It presents the three MTFs from the earlier
cases and their associated ASA and MTF derived transfer payment price per RWP.
HEALTH SERVICE REGION 13
USAF Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 524.98 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 67.44 RWPs
ASA Per RWP = $3,634.00
MTF Price Per RWP - $3,000.00
USA Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 365.45 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 247.11 RWPs
ASA Per RWP = $4,310.00










MTF Price Per RWP
$5,183.00
$5,000.00
Figure 12. Case Study #4. MTF Adjusted Standardized Amount (ASA) and
Derived Price Per RWP
Note that in Figure 12 the MTF derived cost per RWP ($4,500) for the USA
Hospital is greater than the Health Affairs derived ASA price ($4,310). Therefore,
the USA Hospital must use it's assigned ASA price per RWP ($4,500) in any
transfer payment calculations.
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The transfer payment price for a particular DRG is computed by multiplying
the MTF transfer payment price (the ASA or MTF derived price) per RWP times the
base RWP for that particular DRG. As discussed in Chapter III, additional RWPs
for outlier cases are not included. Equation 3 provides the formula to calculate the
transfer payment for a specific DRG.
MTF or ASA BASE DRG
(COST PER RWP) X (DRG RELATIVE WEIGHT) = TRANSFER PAYMENT
Equation 3. Transfer Payment for a DRG
An illustration may be helpful in understanding the process. Suppose, for
instance, the USAF Hospital in Figure 12 has determined that it has exceeded it's
receivable baseline of 524.98 RWPs by 46.80 RWPs (571.78 - 524.98 = 46.80
RWPs). Additionally, the USN Medical Center is already over it's payable
baseline. Furthermore, assume that the USAF Hospital has determined that the
receivable baseline was exceeded due to the referral of 20 patients for craniotomy
(age 0-17), DRG code 003, with a corresponding relative weight of 2.3399
(realistically, this could involve many DRGs and their respective relative weights).
In this illustration, the USAF Hospital must calculate a transfer payment to
reimburse the USN Medical Center (or Military Department). The transfer payment
price is found by taking the cumulative RWPs of DRG 003 multiplied by the referral
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MTF's (USN Medical Center) transfer price. Since the referral MTF's derived
transfer price ($5,000) is less than it's ASA price per RWP ($5,183), it is the MTF's
average cost per RWP. The calculations are as follows:
20 (CASES OF DRG 003) X 2.3399 (DRG WEIGHT) = 46.80 RWPs
$5,000 X 46.80 RWPs = $234,000 (TRANSFER PAYMENT PRICE)
Figure 13. Example of Transfer Payment Calculation
Thus, the USAF Hospital should transfer $234,000 of O&M funds to the USN
Medical Center or it's Military Department (as mentioned earlier, the procedures for
the actual transfer of funds are still under review). Figure 14 provides a summary
of Case Study #4.
As illustrated in Case #2, if the referral MTF had exceeded it's payable
baseline and the referring MTF was still under it's receivable baseline, then the
referral MTF would then begin calculating the dollar value of RWPs over it's
payable baseline using it's own transfer price for reimbursement at a later date.
One other event that may reduce the amount of funds reimbursed from a
referring MTF is the effect of patients with third party insurance. If a third party
insurance company payment is collected by the referral MTF, the third party
insurance payment will be deducted from the final transfer payment charge.
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USAF Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 524.98 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 67.44 RWPs
ASA Per RWP = $3,634.00
MTF Price Per RWP = $3,000.00
ami
USA Hospital
Receivable Baseline = 365.45 RWPs
Payable Baseline = 247.11 RWPs
ASA Per RWP = $4,310.00
MTF Price Per RWP = $4,500.00
20 (Cases) X 2.3399 (DRG Wt.) = 46.80
or 571.78 - 524.98 = 46.80 RWPs
Over Receivable Baseline
fflH'TiSSjijJ'
USAF Hospital Transfer Payment to
USN Medical Center or Mil Dept is:
$5,000 X 46.80 RWPs = $234,000
T
FORMULAS
(CMI) X (# Dispositions) = RWP
(MTF Marginal Costs) / (RWP) = MTF Cost Per RWP






ASA Per RWP = $5,183.00
MTF Price Per RWP = $5,000.00
Figure 14. Case Study #4. Transfer Payment from USAF Hospital to USN
Medical Center
In summary, this chapter discussed the transfer payment policy as published
by Health Affairs. The first part of the chapter discussed why it was needed, the
various components created by the policy, which included the receivable and
payable baselines, and how they determine when a transfer payment is required.
The last part of the chapter examined at how an MTF's transfer price is determined
and the calculations used in computing the actual amount of funds to transfer.
It must be reiterated that although the policy itself has been published, full
implementation has not yet occurred within the MHSS. As with all new policies, a
period of review and adjustment will precede any implementation. Chapter V will
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As noted in Chapter IV, the transfer payment policy, although published, has
not been fully implemented. There have been several implementation issues raised
by the Services that deserve further review. Although the transfer payment policy
has brought into focus the need to aggressively manage referral patterns in the
MTFs, some individuals question whether there is an actual need for this policy in
the direct care system of the MHSS. This chapter will present a compilation and
discussion of the major implementation issues raised by the Services. Since the
success of the transfer payment concept is heavily dependent upon the availability
and analysis of data, the first section discussed will be the information systems
utilized in the transfer payment methodology.
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS
As stated by the Government Accounting Office (GAO):
Lack of adequate, timely, local information on health care provided to
beneficiaries has impeded improvements to the cost-effectiveness of
the MHSS. [Ref 30]
Under a capitation methodology, especially as it applies to the transfer
payment concept, an MTF commander must have accurate and timely information
to be able to properly evaluate the MTF's "business practices" and cost
effectiveness.
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Although Health Affairs has taken steps to streamline the automated
information systems (AIS) processes, eliminate duplication, standardize where
possible, and focus upon functional economic analysis [Ref 4], 13 Jul 95), the full
implementation and effectiveness of the transfer payment concept will be hindered
by the lack of accurate and timely data.
1. Retrospective Case Mix Analysis System (RCMAS)
The RCMAS information system is the primary system used in determining
the status of an MTF's completed workload (RWPs accumulated). As discussed in
Chapter II, RCMAS provides extensive capabilities in functional analysis and
reporting of health care data, but it suffers from three deficiencies: data accuracy,
incomplete data (FY95 receivable and payable baselines were projected based on
FY93 RCMAS data), and usability.
a. Accuracy
Military Department representatives have expressed their concern
about the accuracy and completeness of RCMAS data. For example, a
representative from BUMED commented that a review of recent referral data
provided by RCMAS indicated that several patients were referred from a CONUS
MTF to an unnamed MTF in Germany, which is most unusual, if not highly unlikely
[Ref 20].
RCMAS analysts [Ref. 21] indicated that the flow of data starts from
the individual MTF and is then forwarded to their respective medical headquarters,
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where the data is supposedly validated. It is then forwarded to RCMAS for
integration into the RCMAS database.
The RCMAS analysts consider the data they receive to be already
validated (since it passes through the Services' respective medical headquarters),
but were not aware of any statistical study that was conducted on the accuracy of
RCMAS data [Ref 21]. The thesis author was also unable to determine if any such
study has been ever conducted.
b. Incomplete Data
Another factor of concern regarding RCMAS is the incompleteness of
data. As stated above, the flow of data is from the individual MTF to their
respective medical headquarters, and then to the RCMAS analysts, where it is
integrated into the system. RCMAS analysts state that the incomplete data in
RCMAS data is not caused by the timeliness in RCMAS data input, but rather the
long time it takes to gather and validate (at the respective Services' medical
headquarters) the information. The analysts stated that RCMAS is usually only one
and one-half months behind in providing up-to-date information, although it is
incomplete.
Several things could contribute to incomplete data; delays in MTF
reporting due to continued updating of patient records and possibly delays in
receiving CHAMPUS data. CHAMPUS inpatient beneficiaries have up to one year
after discharge to file a claim. [Ref 21]
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The U.S. Air Force Medical Department stated that RCMAS is typically
three months behind the current reporting month and that this delay is not
conducive to their monthly reporting requirements to the Air Staff. Additionally, the
Air Force stated that since the Composite Health Care System (CHCS) is the
repository for information going into RCMAS and is of a more timely nature, they will
attempt to utilize the data from CHCS instead of RCMAS. [Ref 22]
Thus, the timeliness issue of RCMAS affects the accuracy with which
MTF commanders can track their RWP receivable and payable baselines. Since
RCMAS data is at least one and one-half months behind (a year if the
completeness factor is considered), an MTF won't realize that a baseline has been
exceeded until much later, unless they are tracking the data separately by other
means.
Additional problems occur at the end of the fiscal year, when an MTF's
O&M funds expire and are recouped. If a transfer payment must be made, it will
have to be made from the following year's funding because an MTF may not know
that it has exceeded a baseline until the RCMAS data is complete. This situation
may pose financial planning problems for MTFs in the projection of available funds
in the upcoming year.
c. Usability
The RCMAS system offers a myriad of standard reports but it's
usability (i.e., user friendliness) by the average analyst is suspect. An analyst at
the U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM), in a recent interview [Ref. 23],
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indicated disappointment in RCMAS's lack of pertinent transfer payment reports
and analyses (RCMAS does provide Patient Origin and RWP Summary Report).
Also, RCMAS does not easily lend itself to certain user requested customized
reports and analyses. In such cases, RCMAS reporting and analysis capabilities
must be modified by RCMAS personnel (this is done through user submitted DMIS
Deficiency Report).
2. Medical Expense Performance and Reporting System (MEPRS)
MEPRS data allows an MTF to determine it's costs at the work center level,
if desired. Similar to the problems associated with RCMAS, data accuracy is a
concern, but again thesis research was unable to determine whether or not a
statistical study has ever been conducted on the accuracy of MEPRS data.
However, personal experience with MEPRS tends to support the need for an
accuracy check, especially since the information provided by MEPRS is used in
MTF costing analysis and for determining adjusted standardized amounts (ASAs).
3. Resource Analysis and Planning System (RAPS)
As discussed in Chapter II, RAPS provides modeling and analytical tools to
forecast military health care beneficiary population, workload, and costs. The
models enable RAPS users to estimate and analyze the impact of alternative
assumptions and policy decisions on resource requirements. Proper identification
of the population base is essential for successful planning, programming, and
execution of a capitated resource allocation system. [Ref 4]
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RAPS projections support capitation-based allocation by converting eligible
populations to user estimates. Projections of users are calculated by applying user
ratio estimates from semi-annual surveys (mentioned in Chapter II) to projections
of eligible beneficiaries. Thus, RAPS produces both eligible and user population
projections. [Ref 24]
The semi-annual survey utilized by RAPS to project actual users undergoes
extensive statistical analysis and is the best source of current population
projections, but again the data must be accurate since it is critical to MTF
commanders and Lead Agents in their workload projections.
Therefore, if MTF commanders and Lead Agents are to accurately project
their workload and referral patterns, an enrollment system that captures all
beneficiaries, regardless of the TRICARE benefit option chosen, should eventually
be instituted.
Health Affairs recognizes the deficiencies in the current information system
and has invested heavily in "upgrading" current information system capabilities.
The Ambulatory Data System (ADS) will provide accurate and timely analysis
of outpatient data (and could be used to extend the transfer payment methodology
to the outpatient side) and the Corporate Executive Information System (CEIS) will
provide critical management information to MTF commanders. However, during




Under capitation budgeting, an MTF is allocated a fixed amount per
beneficiary for a defined catchment area population. However, the users of an MTF
do not always come from the facility's catchment area. As seen in the case studies
of Chapter IV, users may include patients from noncatchment areas and referrals
from other catchment areas. Consequently, capitation resource allocation may
serve as an incentive for MTFs to shift beneficiaries to other facilities within the
MHSS (as demonstrated by the US Army's experience discussed in Chapter IV).
To prevent this shift and encourage more aggressive management of referrals,
Health Affairs established the transfer payment policy.
The transfer payment policy was not designed to be a money making
venture, but to ensure equitable costing under a capitated system. The policy also
does not contain any penalties for MTFs which fall below their payable baselines,
nor does it provide for refunds to facilities which do not fully utilize their receivable
baselines. Unused capacity relative to baselines should be directed toward
recapturing CHAMPUS workload. [Ref 25]
Although the policy was not meant to be a "money making" mechanism, it
could be utilized as such. As an interesting note, BUMED stated [Ref. 20] that a
U.S. Army MTF recently contacted them for a transfer payment regarding a certain
procedure that they wanted to "buy" from a Navy MTF. The Army MTF probably
had excess capacity for this particular procedure and, if provided the additional
funding (through transfer payment from the Navy), it would absorb the added Navy
workload.
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The mechanism to transfer workload is available under the transfer payment
concept and could be used to establish new referral patterns, although this is not
the intent. The following question was posed by the Lead Agent of Health Services
Region (HSR) 3.
Can regions "buy-out" workload from other regions so new intra-
regional referral patterns can be developed (thus minimizing financial
implications of inter-regional referrals)? For instance, if the
aeromedical evacuation routes are changed, Regions 3 and 4 could
"buy-out" their respective historical workloads so new referral patterns
can be established. [Ref. 26]
In effect, the transfer payment mechanisms could facilitate such "shifts" in
workload. However, the thrust of the policy was only meant to "shift" funds to where
the care is actually provided - not to change the structure in which those health
care services are provided.
Referral MTFs (transfers in) could possibly increase their allocated funding
by providing care in excess of the total payable baseline. This can be
accomplished by referral MTFs developing transfer payment prices that are less
than other health care agencies to entice referring MTFs to refer patients to their
facility. [Ref 26]
If a referral MTF was in close proximity to another MTF offering similar health
care services, there would be an incentive to compete for referral workload. Once
the payable baseline was exceeded, referral MTFs would begin accumulating the
dollar value of those RWPs over their baseline and would receive reimbursement
through the transfer payment mechanisms.
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Additionally, the policy states that MTFs have an incentive to reduce their
receivable baselines (transfers out) to facilitate the recapture of CHAMPUS
workload by referring those instead. Through improved utilization management
(UM) techniques, the efficiency with which an MTF operates could improve to the
point where the receivable baseline is in fact reduced, however, the incentive to do
this appears to be relatively weak.
For example, if an MTF commander was able to reduce the MTF's
receivable baseline and recapture some of the CHAMPUS workload, the MTF
commander would not directly receive the funds associated with those CHAMPUS
savings. The government would receive 80% of the recaptured CHAMPUS funds,
while the Managed Care Support (MCS) contractor would keep 20% of the savings.
Although the savings to the government and the contractor could be substantial,
there is no direct incentive for the MTF commander to pursue such a course.
Subsequently, the incentive for the MTF commander is to fully utilize the MTF's
entire receivable baseline.
Another factor that dampens some of the incentives of the transfer payment
policy, is the inability to carry over "savings" or "profits" to the following fiscal year.
This fact has long been debated in the DoD as seen in a statement by BUMED
several years ago before the implementation of the transfer payment policy.
Multi-year appropriations are needed as well as the flexibility to carry
money from year to year to facilitate wise and prudent expenditures
of money rather than fostering a rush to spend end of year money to
avoid loss of funds. Allowing money to carry over fiscal years and to
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combine with new appropriations will enable MTFs to accomplish
tasks/functions which might not otherwise be achievable. [Ref. 27]
Allowing MTFs to carry over their "savings" resulting from transfer payments
would certainly incentivize them to aggressively manage their referral patterns.
Health Affairs has indicated that legislation is currently being pursued to allow for
a 5 percent "carry over" of total O&M funds [Ref. 28].
The effect of exceeded baselines on health care access is still unclear, but
MTFs that have exceeded either their receivable or payable baselines may be
tempted to limit access to health care services. Although this action appears to be
extreme, the incentive still exists. In any case, if an MTF should refer a TRICARE
Prime patient, then the uniform access requirements (published by Health Affairs




Many questions remain unresolved in the actual transfer of funds under the
transfer payment policy guidelines. For instance, given the problems associated
with the timeliness of RCMAS data, when will the actual transfer of funds occur?
This question has not been answered as of the date of this thesis, but it appears
that an actual transfer of funds may occur when deemed "appropriate" by the
Services involved.
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Will the actual transfer occur at the headquarters level or will it occur
between MTFs? At present, the Services have agreed to simplify the procedure by
handling all such transfers at the headquarters level.
The Services are also concerned with the difficulty of administering the
transfer payment policy. It has been stated that the policy, if followed as currently
written, could be administratively burdening relative to the "value added". For
instance, MTFs that have exceeded their receivable or payable baselines would
have to monitor their baselines on a daily basis and bill appropriately. Currently,
the MTFs are not staffed for this additional task.
Third party insurance implications also increase the administrative difficulties
of transfer payments. As stated in the policy, the third party insurance company
payment is to be deducted from the transfer payment charge. The referral MTF
providing the care is responsible for initiating and monitoring total billing from the
third party insurer. Upon receiving the final collection from the insurer, the referral
MTF will then balance the bill, if necessary. This requirement would be difficult to
fulfill. It requires that the MTFs not only ensure that the third party insurance
company is properly billed, but also ensure that any previously paid or billed
transfer payment is provided an appropriate credit.
The addition of Lead Agents into this scenario further complicates
administration of the transfer payment methodology. GAO noted this in a 1995
testimony before the House of Representatives.
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Issues related to lead agent control and authority are inherently
complex because TRICARE calls for the lead agent to coordinate all
care provided in the region, including contractor provided care.
While TRICARE provides a framework to foster teamwork and
regional health care delivery, it remains to be seen whether lead
agents will be able to overcome the effects of inter-Service rivalries
that have historically hampered efforts to promote joint-Service
cooperation in health care delivery. [Ref. 8]
The structure of TRICARE, as you may recall from Chapter II, is such that
MTFs receive their funding from their respective Services' medical headquarters
and not from the lead agents. It is also interesting to note that a recent
conversation with a Service's medical headquarters representative indicated that
lead agents of certain regions were not receptive to certain Service specific
guidance regarding the transfer payment policy.
In understanding the lead agent's reaction, one must realize that the lead
agent is concerned primarily with providing health care services to it's beneficiaries
in accordance with the region's health care plan. It is the responsibility of the
Services to provide the necessary funding to carry out the regional health care
plans. The lead agent, then, is concerned with that portion of the transfer payment
policy that may affect the ability of it's regional MTFs to provide the health care
services as required by the region's health care plan.
2. Central Fund
The policy indicated that a central fund could be established by the Military
Departments to accrue funds generated from transfer payments. This concept is
similar to the "cost pool" concept utilized by HMOs. The cost pool accumulates a
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percentage of the fixed fees paid by HMO enrollees and is utilized to reduce risk
(from higher than expected costs, i.e., referrals) for HMO network providers.
Although two Services contend that the administration of such a fund would
be an administrative burden, the U.S. Army has apparently adopted the "central
fund" concept as shown in their implementation letter.
Initially, at the beginning of the fiscal year a transfer of payment
consolidated withhold will be maintained at MEDCOM (U.S. Army
Medical Command) level much as the catastrophic CHAMPUS and
supplemental care reinsurance pots. This pot of money will then be
utilized to finance inter-Army transfer as needed throughout the fiscal
year. Money received from the sister Services for billed workload can
then be put into the transfer payment pot, which will filter down to the
affected MTF based upon documented UB-92 (Uniformed Billing form
92) billings in the latter part of the fiscal year. [Ref. 25]
As stated earlier, the other two Services have not established a central fund
and the effectiveness of the U.S. Army approach is yet to be studied.
3. Adjusted Standardized Amounts (ASAs)
The ASA concept could facilitate comparisons between MTFs, and between
MTFs and the private-sector. This would provide some measure of relative
performance. However, as stated by BUMED [Ref. 29], there are several potential
problems with using the current ASA methodology.
Specifically, the concerns are: the MTF specific ASA rates do not reflect the
actual cost of any MTF's cost per RWP; an ASA rate for any MTF is affected by all
other MTFs in that Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); it would be misleading to
compare ASA rates among MTFs; specific MTF ASA rates are not published in the
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Federal Register; and that external agencies may misinterpret a MTF's ASA rate as
the actual cost of inpatient care.
A recommended alternative approach to MTF specific ASA rates is to replace
them with regional ASA rates. [Ref. 29]
E. MANAGED CARE SUPPORT CONTRACT (MCSC)
The participation of the Managed Care Support Contract (MCSC) contractor
in the transfer payment policy is perhaps one of the most debated issues. Recall
from Chapter IV that if an MTF issues a nonavailability statement (NAS), the MCSC
contractor can refer that patient to another MTF vice it's civilian network. However,
the contractor will not have to pay for the care if the referral MTF (transfers out) has
not exceeded it's total payable baseline. In such a case, an adjustment would have
to be made to the bid price adjustment to ensure the contractor does not receive
"free" care and credit for the NAS issuance as a result of the same procedure
(contractor reimbursements are based on number of NASs issued).
Lead agents and MTFs fear that the contractor will in fact receive a "wind
fall" profit if this is not carefully managed. Additionally, some have questioned the
legality of using the NAS (since it was designed to authorize CHAMPUS
expenditures) as indicated in the policy and the receipt of transfer payments from
the MCSC contractor. This issue has apparently been addressed and found to be
within legal bounds - although procedural problems still remain.
The impact on Specialized Treatment Services (STS) is less clear. As noted
in Chapter IV, the MCSC contractor must give STSs the first right of refusal for all
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applicable referrals, including inter-regional referrals, when STS boundaries are
applicable.
Similar to standard MTFs, STS referral facilities will not receive funds
through the transfer payment mechanism (from referring MTFs or the contractor)
unless their total payable base has been exceeded. As outlined above, the MCSC
contractor will not have to pay for STS care until the total RWP payable baseline
has been exceeded.
The impact of contractor participation in the transfer payment policy on a
newly established 200 mile catchment area for STS facilities and the MCSC
contract bid price adjustment is uncertain. In any case, the Services medical
headquarters and several lead agents have recommended utilizing other methods
of "workload balancing" for the MCSC contractor instead of transfer payments.
F. CURRENT STATUS
As previously discussed, the transfer payment policy was not fully
implemented In FY95 and it is interesting to note that not a single dollar was
formally transferred between MTFs or Services as a result of the transfer payment
policy in FY95. Although several MTFs exceeded their RWP receivable and
payable baselines during FY95, the individual Services remained well below their
total baselines [Ref. 30].
Table 8 presents the Services' total RWP receivable and payable baselines
as compared to the actual FY95 results. The Services, overall, were substantially
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under their Services' total baselines. As such, the Services agreed not to
implement the formal calculations of the transfer payment methodology in FY95.
Table 9 presents a table of the number of MTFs per Service exceeding their
RWP receivable and payable baselines in FY95. Note that one third of the Army's
MTFs exceeded their FY95 payable baselines. This was the highest position.
FY95RWP FY95RWP FY95RWP FY95 RWP
RECEIVABLE RECEIVABLE % PAYABLE PAYABLE %
SERVICE BASEUNE ACTUAL DIFF. BASELINE ACTUAL DIFF.
USA 47,276 40,135 -15% 63,759 57,681 -10%
USN 17,766 15,465 -13% 37,147 28,571 -23%
USAF 29,852 25,163 -15% 49,620 40,885 -18%
TOTAL 94,894 80,763 -15% 150,506 127,137
-16%
Table 8. FY95 Service Baselines and Actuals. After [Ref. 31]
MTFs MTFs
TOTAL MTFs EXCEEDING FY95 EXCEEDING FY95
BY RECEIVABLE PAYABLE
SERVICE SERVICE BASEUNE BASELINE
U.S. Army 32 6 11
U.S. Navy 22 4 3
U.S. Air Force 50 5 10
TOTAL 104 15 24
Table 9. MTFs Exceeding FY95 Baselines by Service.
After [Ref 31]
Table 10 presents, individually, those MTFs that exceeded their FY95
receivable baselines (transfers out). The transfer payment column was calculated
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using the referring MTF's own ASA price (see Appendix A), since the referral MTFs
prices were not known to the thesis author. In FY95, the Army would have made
transfer payments totaling $3,918,815, the Air Force $1,569,859, and the Navy
$8,525,414. Their combined total of $8,525,414 represents the total amount of
funds that would have been transferred to other MTFs.
Table 11 presents, individually, those MTFs that exceeded their FY95
payable baselines (transfers in). In this case, these referral MTFs would be
reimbursed for the amount of RWPs over their payable baseline. As directed in the
transfer payment policy, these MTFs will compute their "transfer receipts" utilizing
an MTF derived transfer price or the MTF specific ASA price. Since the MTF
derived prices were not available to the thesis author, the MTF specific ASA prices
were used in computing the "transfer receipts". In FY95, the Army MTFs would be
reimbursed $8,918,573, the Air Force $3,245,898, and the Navy $132,580. The
combined total of $12,297,051 represents the total amount of funds that would be
reimbursed to the referral MTFs. Reimbursement to these MTFs would come either
through transfer payments from other MTFs or a direct reimbursement from their
respective Services.
Although MTFs with each Service exceeded their FY95 baselines, no Service
exceeded their total receivable or payable baselines. One could make an argument
that the transfer payment policy incentivized this behavior. In any case, Health
Affairs believes that trends for lower utilization will likely continue and at this stage,
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in the interim, plans to keep the transfer payment policy in place as a "background"
control system. [Ref. 31]
As stated by a former member of the original Health Affairs transfer payment
policy committee.
It may sound ideal, but if MTFs truly embrace the paradigm of
TRICARE, utilization management, capitation, and good business
practice in patient care decisions, a sophisticated structure for MTF-
to-MTF transfer payments may prove unnecessary. [Ref. 32]
Certainly, FY95 was an indication that the Services and individual MTFs
proved that referral patterns can be managed effectively. However, whether this
was a direct result of the transfer payment policy is debatable.
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MEDICAL TREATMENT RECEIVABLE RECEIVABLE % TRANSFER









HUACHUCA 347 390 43 12%
WALTER REED AMC-
WASH DC 1583 1940 357 23%
BLANCHFIELD ACH-FT.
CAMBELL 785 879 94 12%
BAYNE-JONES ACH-
FT. POLK 529 772 243 46%
REYNOLDS ACH-FT.
SILL
933 1071 138 15%
MCDONALD ACH-FT.
EUSTIS 1795 1915 120 7%








MOUNTAIN HOME 163 237 74 45%
MALCOLM GROW-
ANDREWS 2979 3113 134 5%
97TH MED GRP-ALTUS 391 516 125 32%
47TH MED SQUAD-
LAUGHLIN 404 428 24 6%
WILFORD HALL-
LACKLAND 2116 2148 32 1%






NH OAKLAND 1102 1342 240 22%
NH PENSACOLA 643 703 60 9%
NNMC BETHESDA 2355 2705 350 15%
NH CHERRY POINT 570 590 20 4%
NAVY TOTAL 4670 5340 670 $3,036,740
SERVICES TOTAL 16,695 18,749 2054 $8,525,414
Table 10 MTFs Exceeding FY95 Receivable Baselines.
ASA. After [Ref. 31]
Using MTF's
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MEDICAL TREATMENT PAYABLE PAYABLE % TRANSFER














ARSENAL 174 204 30 17%
NOBLE ACH-
MCCLELLAN 359 377 18 5%
EVANS ACH-FT.
CARSON 722 743 21 3%
MARTIN ACH-FT.
BENNING 353 464 111 31%
TRIPLER AMC-FT.
SHAFTER 1979 2362 383 19%
MUNSON ACH-FT.
LEAVENWORTH 126 130 4 3%
IRELAND ACH-FT.
KNOX 463 675 212 46%
BAYNE-JONES ACH-
FT. POLK 347 523 176 51%
MONCRIEF ACH-FT.
JACKSON 971 1654 683 70%
WILLIAM BEAUMONT-
FT. BLISS
2263 2445 182 8%
BROOKE AMC-FT. SAM
HOUSTON 9725 10139 414 4%








101 143 42 42%
56TH MED GRP-
MACDILL
442 478 36 8%
MALCOLM GROW-
ANDREWS 3182 3266 84 3%
5544TH MED GROUP-
NELLIS
119 284 165 138%
Table 11 MTFs Exceeding FY95 Payable Baselines. 'Using MTF's ASA
Price. After [Ref. 31]
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MEDICAL PAYABLE PAYABLE % TRANSFER
TREATMENT FACILITY BASELINE ACTUAL DIFF. DIFF. RECEIPr
49TH MED GRP-







SEYMOUR JOHNSON 63 85 22 35%
5TH MED GRP-MINOT 309 338 29 9%
47TH MED SQUAD-
LAUGHLIN 30 31 1 5%
649TH MED GRP-HILL 156 329 173 111%
1STMEDGRP-
LANGLEY 958 1338 380 40%






PALMS 85 99 14 16%
NH CHERRY POINT 34 38 4 11%
NH OAK HARBOR 37 57 20 55%
NAVY TOTAL 156 194 38 $132,580
SERVICES TOTAL 23,060 26,283 3,223 $12,297,051
Table 11. (Continued)
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system, and the information systems currently utilized in the MHSS. Next, Chapter
III defined and examined the factors used in determining and computing a transfer
payment. Then, in Chapter IV, the "triggering" mechanisms of the policy were
studied through the use of illustrations to observe when a transfer payment would
be initiated and how the actual amount of funds to transfer were computed. Lastly,
the current implementation issues of the Services and lead agents were presented
and discussed in Chapter V.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this research reveal that DoD's modified capitation resource
allocation system could incentivize cost shifting behavior and that the transfer
payment methodology, if not properly managed, could strengthen this incentive.
Although the transfer payment policy was not designed to be a revenue
producing mechanism, it could be perceived as an opportunity to increase an MTF's
allocated funding. If given the opportunity, MTFs will naturally compete for the
limited resources available within the MHSS.
Although the policy, as mentioned previously, was not fully implemented in
FY95, one could ascertain from this research that the establishment of receivable
and payable baselines would instill certain economic behaviors within MTFs.
Exceeding a receivable baseline would mean that a referring MTF would
have to "pay" actual funds to a referral MTF for those additional services.
Consequently, the incentive would be to stay well below the receivable baseline.
As noted in Table 9 of Chapter V, of the 104 MTFs in the MHSS direct care system,
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14% of the MTFs exceeded their receivable baselines. The total amount of funds
that would have transferred (using the MTF's ASA price) equaled $8,525,414, which
is roughly only 2 percent of the estimated $450 million spent on direct inpatient
care for referrals. If the transfer payment policy is ever fully implemented (no funds
were actually transferred in FY95), the number of MTFs exceeding their receivable
baselines could be expected to decline.
Conversely, if actual funds would be received, referral MTFs that have
already exceeded their payable baselines, could increase their allocated funding
by accepting as many referrals from referring MTFs as possible. In FY95, 23% of
the 104 MTFs exceeded their payable baselines. The amount in total receipts
totaled $12,297,051, roughly 3% of the $450 million spent on referral inpatient care.
This is a relatively small percentage of the total amount spent on inpatient care, but
with the added incentive (transfer payment policy implementation) of actually
receiving additional funds, the number of MTFs exceeding their payable baselines
could be expected to grow.
Table 12 presents a summary of Tables 10 and 11. It shows the amount of
funds ($12.2 Million) that would have transferred in FY95 between MTFs or
Services due to exceeded receivable (transfers out) and payable (transfers in)
baselines. Recall from Chapter V that specific MTF ASA prices from Appendix A
were used in calculating transfer payments. Note in Table 12 that the Army totals
comprise roughly 46 percent and 73 percent of the total potential transfers for
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exceeding the 1995 receivable and payable baselines, respectively. Relative to the




SERVICE (Transfers Out) (Transfers In)
U.S. Army $3.9 Million $8.9 Million
U.S. Navy $3.0 Million $0.1 Million
U.S. Air Force $1 .6 Million $3.2 Million
TOTAL $8.5 Million $12.2 Million
Table 12. Summary of Transfer Payments for FY95
The information systems currently utilized are inadequate to support the data
requirements of the transfer payment policy as written. The data needs to be
accurate, timely, and readily accessible. Future systems, such as CEIS and ADS,
could easily accommodate the transfer payment concept on an inpatient as well as
outpatient basis.
The administrative procedures in the policy should be clarified and
standardized across all Services, Health Service Regions (HSRs), and MTFs. For
instance, when should the actual transfer of funds occur (i.e., end of the year,
quarterly, monthly) and what mechanism will be used to document billings (UB-
92?). Additionally, what role will the lead agents have in the transfer payment
policy? Lead agents are the crucial link within the HSRs in the coordination of
health care services. They should be intimately involved in the policy to ensure
referral patterns are in concert with the region's long-term health care services plan.
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There are several implementation issues related to the transfer payment
policy, but none of them can't be overcome by slight adjustments in the current
policy. One exception may be the participation of the Managed Care Support
(MCS) contractor. This thesis cannot determine the effects of such participation,
mainly because the policy itself has not been fully implemented, however this
particular issue should be fully addressed prior to a decision to implement all facets
of the transfer payment policy.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the findings and conclusions of this research, it appears that the
transfer payment policy is following a natural course of evolution. All new policies
initially come under some scrutiny, until certain adjustments are made, then they
are accepted as a natural fact of everyday life. Indeed, the policy itself, as written,
has provoked some debate within the military medical establishment, but after
review of FY95 actual data, this debate may have been for nought.
Subsequently, the recommendation of this thesis is to refine the procedures,
improve the information systems, and if desired, apply these techniques at some
future date when it is perhaps more feasible. In any case, given the Services' spirit
of mutual cooperation in resolving this issue, it may prove to be prudent just to
leave the policy in place as a "background" control system.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The focus of this research was to examine and evaluate the transfer payment
policy. This research uncovered several areas that impacted upon the transfer
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payment methodology, but due to the limitations of this study, those areas were not
investigated. The items below warrant further research:
• Conduct a statistical analysis of the accuracy and timeliness of data
submitted and stored within RCMAS or MEPRS.
• Conduct a study on an MTF's marginal cost of doing business as
compared to it's calculated adjusted standardized amount (ASA) and
similar private-sector medical facilities.
• Examine the decision making process for resource allocation as it
relates to the Services' medical departments and lead agents.
• Examine and evaluate the incentives associated with the Managed
Care Support contractor and determine what adjustments could be
made to the contract to mutually benefit the government and
contractor.
• Study the differences between the Services and MTFs in potential
transfers as seen in Tables 10, 11, and 12.
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APPENDIX A. APPROVED FY95 BASELINES AND MTF ASA PRICE
This Appendix provides the FY95 baselines for individual Military Treatment
Facilities (MTF) and their Adjusted Standardized Amounts (ASA).
FY95 RWP FY95 RWP FY95
U.SARMY RECEIVABLE PAYABLE ASA PRICE
MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY BASELINE BASELINE PERRWP
FOXACH-REDSTONE ARSENAL 339.80 173.45 $3,222.00
NOBLE ACH-FT MCCLELLAN 416.58 358.88 $3,366.00
LYSTER ACH-FT RUCKER 568.92 227.08 $3,222.00
BASSETTACH-FT WAINWRIGHT 321.39 145.73 $4,374.00
BLISS ACH-FT HUACHUCA 347.05 127.99 $4,120.00
FITZSIMONS AMC-DENVER 316.79 5948.85 $4,110.00
EVANS ACH-FT CARSON 3049.53 721.54 $3,471.00
WALTER REED AMC-WASH DC 1582.69 19365.87 $4,500.00
EISENHOWER AMC-FT GORDON 220.09 6715.70 $4,051.00
MARTIN ACH-FT BENNING 1066.56 353.10 $3,234.00
WINN ACH-FTSTEWART 1192.57 304.26 $3,416.00
TRIPLER AMC-FT SHAFTER 250.53 1979.50 $4,815.00
IRWIN ACH-FT RILEY 797.58 228.68 $3,839.00
MUNSON ACH-FT LEAVENWORTH 449.02 126.06 $3,203.00
BLANCHFIELD ACH-FT CAMBELL 784.78 585.64 $3,124.00
IRELAND ACH-FTKNOX 455.80 463.13 $4,133.00
BAYNE-JONES ACH-FT POLK 528.54 346.59 $4,143.00
KIMBROUGH ACH-FT MEADE 6261.11 1236.00 $3,255.00
L WOOD ACH-FT LEONARD WOOD 632.25 1169.43 $3,922.00
PATTERSON ACH-FTMONMOUTH 558.81 254.27 $3,566.00
KELLER ACH-WEST POINT 529.47 454.98 $3,644.00
WOMACK AMC-FT BRAGG 1800.13 1238.53 $3,371.00
REYNOLDS ACH-FT SILL 933.15 224.62 $3,395.00
MONCRIEF ACH-FT JACKSON 835.98 970.61 $3,445.00
WILLIAM BEAUMONTAMC-FT BLISS 350.94 2263.46 $4,149.00
BROOKE AMC-FTSAM HOUSTON 5926.48 9725.41 $4,249.00
DARNALL ACH-FT HOOD 3859.97 516.16 $3,580.00
MCDONALD ACH-FT EUSTIS 1795.42 687.76 $3,052.00
KENNER ACH-FT LEE 718.78 789.04 $3,437.00
DEWITTACH-FT BELVOIR 9537.64 765.15 $3,339.00
MADIGAN AMC-FT LEWIS 483.04 5045.09 $5,207.00
WEED ACH-FT IRWIN 365.45 247.11 $4,310.00













502ND MED GRP-MAXWELL 352.30 212.64 $3,521.00
3RD MED CTR-ELMENDORF 317.30 485.69 $3,575.00
58TH MED GRP-LUKE 750.30 337.28 $3,256.00
355TH MED GRP-DAVIS MONTHAN 305.14 151.40 $3,551.00
314TH MED GRP-LITTLE ROCK 314.70 184.99 $3,401.00
DAVID GRANT MED CTR-TRAVIS 613.94 5860.67 $4,969.00
9TH MED GRP-BEALE 603.55 59.95 $3,564.00
93RD MED GRP-CASTLE 354.73 15.03 $3,556.00
30TH MED GRP-VANDENBERG 189.39 121.55 $3,657.00
650TH MED GRP-EDWARDS 524.98 67.44 $3,634.00
22ND MED GRP-MARCH 943.25 1008.74 $3,413.00
USAFACADEMYHOSP 1376.33 1102.75 $3,549.00
436TH MED GRP-DOVER 981.26 101.00 $3,541.00
646TH MED GRP-EGUN 998.51 633.78 $3,522.00
325TH MED GRP-TYNDALL 532.03 100.59 $3,534.00
56TH MED GRP-MACDILL 592.05 441.62 $3,242.00
45TH MED GRP-PATRICK 577.03 102.01 $3,496.00
347THMED GRP-MOODY 429.39 67.58 $4,219.00
653RD MED GRP-ROBINS 497.89 61.45 $3,553.00
366TH MED GRP-MOUNTAIN HOME 163.19 302.68 $4,284.00
USAF MED CTR-SCOTT 412.54 1324.72 $3,236.00
2ND MED GRP-BARKSDALE 248.91 281.62 $3,541.00
MALCOM GROWMCTR-ANDREWS 2978.52 3182.19 $3,619.00
410TH MED GRP-K.I. SAWYER 113.91 38.64 $4,267.00
KEESLER MEDICAL CENTER 480.14 5029.20 $4,424.00
14TH MED SQUAD-COLUMBUS 151.35 116.88 $4,231.00
351STMED GRP-WHITEMAN 283.01 129.01 $4,203.00
EHRLING BERQUIST HOSP-OFFUTT 253.80 420.84 $3,548.00
554TH MED GRP-NELLIS 409.11 119.46 $3,556.00
542ND MED GRP-KIRTLAND 177.20 227.95 $3,554.00
49TH MED GRP-HOLLOMAN 1192.03 61.89 $4,284.00
27TH MED GRP-CANNON 351.52 29.80 $4,292.00
416TH MED GRP-GRIFFIS 72.01 30.73 $3,551.00
4TH MED GRP-SEYMOUR JOHNSON 419.26 63.42 $4,244.00
319TH MED GRP-GRAND FORKS 295.88 57.13 $3,497.00
5TH MED GRP-MINOT 205.13 309.03 $4,185.00
USAF MCTR WRIGHT-PATTERSON 264.84 3334.20 $4,648.00
fU.S. Air Force continued on next oaae).
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FY95 RWP FY95 RWP FY95
U.S AIR FORCE RECEIVABLE PAYABLE ASA PRICE
MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY BASELINE BASELINE PER RWP
654TH MED GRP-TINKER 490.14 229.36 $3,514.00
97TH MED GRP-ALTUS 391.32 29.22 $4,221.00
363RD MED GRP-SHAW 678.95 186.91 $3,593.00
28TH MED GRP-ELLSWORTH 287.81 84.11 $3,515.00
96TH MED GRP-DYESS 523.57 43.37 $3,535.00
396TH MED GRP-SHEPPARD 684.22 1494.18 $3,518.00
47TH MED SQUAD-LAUGHLIN 404.28 29.88 $4,314.00
WILFORD HALL MCTR-LACKLAND 2116.04 19551.29 $4,273.00
649TH MED GRP-HILL 211.61 155.74 $3,243.00
1ST MED GRP-LANGLEY 1843.25 957.83 $3,233.00
92ND MED GRP-FAIRCHILD 218.73 375.46 $3,560.00
90TH MED GRP-F.E. WARREN 489.81 96.24 $3,530.00
652ND MED GRP-MCCLELLAN 1786.78 211.29 $3,281.00
U.S. AIR FORCE TOTAL 29852.93 49620.43
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FY9S RWP FY95 RWP FY95
V.S NAVY RECEIVABLE PAYABLE ASA PRICE
MEDICAL TREATMENTFACILITY BASELINE BASELINE PER RWP
NH CAMP PENDLETON 2954.33 2315.31 $3,338.00
NH OAKLAND 1102.00 3651.27 $4,437.00
NH LEMOORE 543.47 40.72 $4,264.00
NH SAN DIEGO 417.99 5838.25 $5,183.00
NH TWENTYNINE PALMS 531.09 84.73 $3,388.00
NH GROTON 266.45 390.55 $3,575.00
NH PENSACOLA 642.87 686.68 $3,482.00
NH JACKSONVILLE 456.76 865.14 $3,493.00
NH ORLANDO 454.59 886.05 $3,239.00
NH GREAT LAKES 378.37 1528.06 $3,272.00
NNMC BETHESDA 2355.21 11443.52 $4,802.00
NH PATUXENT RIVER 1066.28 81.65 $4,111.00
NH CAMP LEJEUNE 700.02 992.70 $3,317.00
NH CHERRY POINT 569.74 34.07 $4,112.00
NH NEWPORT 230.58 211.68 $3,595.00
NH CHARLESTON 311.46 490.60 $3,490.00
NH BEAUFORT 546.76 126.17 $4,182.00
NH MILLINGTON 213.10 279.44 $3,218.00
NH CORPUS CHRISTI 802.90 382.57 $3,534.00
NH PORTSMOUTH 1156.38 6028.03 $4,382.00
NH BREMERTON 1470.88 753.70 $3,530.00
NH OAK HARBOR 595.58 36.87 $3,435.00
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